Share Law: Toward a New Understanding of Corporate Law by Raz, Asaf
255 
SHARE LAW:  
TOWARD A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF CORPORATE LAW 
ASAF RAZ* 
ABSTRACT 
Shares are an instrumental phenomenon in law, finance and 
modern life.  Much of corporate law revolves around shares and 
shareholders, but our current understanding of shares is in a trou-
bling posture:  it resorts to various frameworks—contract, proper-
ty, trust, and fiduciary law—neither of which can correctly ac-
commodate the concept of shares.  Contrary to prevailing notions, 
in both Delaware and other jurisdictions around the world, this Ar-
ticle proves that shareholders are not directly owed fiduciary du-
ties; nor can they be simply described as contractual parties, due to 
the unique properties of shares as residual claims.  Where do 
shares derive their value from?  What rules and principles govern 
shares?  The answer is that shares inhabit their own legal space. 
Weaving together corporate theory, doctrine, and real-life cases, 
this Article proposes the concept of share law, a new field of classi-
fication within corporate law.  Share law, which is grounded in eq-
uity, provides the normative structure for conceptualizing, analyz-
ing, and resolving share-related issues—including some very high-
profile topics, such as dividends and buybacks, aspects of mergers 
and acquisitions, appraisal rights, multiple-class equity, sharehold-
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er voting and activism, and shareholder litigation.  This Article 
presents a nuanced account, strongly supported both positively 
and normatively, of shares and their proper treatment within cor-
porate and general law.  In the process, it sheds new light on other 
areas in high currency, including corporate fiduciary law, corpo-
rate personhood, and the law of corporate purpose. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Shares are fascinating.  This type of security, issued by corpora-
tions,1 ignites the imagination for the perceived unlimited upside it 
offers to the lucky investor who picks the “right” share.  On a more 
concrete level, shares form the spinal column of modern economy. 
The total value of shares publicly traded on the world’s exchanges, 
in 2017, was more than US$77 trillion.2  Peoples’ life savings lean 
on shares, or share-related instruments and schemes.3  Share offer-
ings finance the global expansion of human activity through corpo-
rations.  In addition, shareholders—not other creditors—have a 
substantial degree of control over the governance mechanisms of 
corporations, through voting and other means, including access to 
certain types of legal actions.  Since corporations are immensely 
important actors in today’s world, shareholders occupy a unique 
position indeed. 
Against this backdrop, it is troubling to realize how little we 
know about shares.  Other types of corporate obligations, such as 
bonds, emanate from detailed contracts, defining the parties’ rights 
and duties.  Even where the contract itself is lacking, contract law 
provides ample solutions.  When we turn to the “share contract”—
the corporation’s constitutional documents4—we quickly discover 
1  In this Article, “corporation” alternates between two meanings.  Mostly, it 
refers to several different types of artificial persons, which include the company, 
the cooperative, the partnership and others, as far as the range of corporate laws 
in a given jurisdiction allows.  They include both for-profit and other-purpose 
corporations.  Related phrases, such as “corporate law,” should be accordingly 
construed.  More narrowly, a “corporation” is how Delaware and similar U.S. law 
describes the type of entity which other jurisdictions, including Israel and the 
U.K., call a “company.”  See Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, ch. 1 (2018) [hereinafter: DGCL].  This duality is not problematic, since every
Delaware corporation is also a corporation in the broader sense.  Where relevant
in this Article, it is clear that the reference is to Delaware corporations, rather than
corporations in the more general sense.
2 See Stocks traded, total value (current US$), THE WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRAD.CD 
[https://perma.cc/622W-XFFC] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).  The numbers stated in 
that source should be considered in addition to the value of shares issued by pri-
vate, or non-publicly-traded, corporations. 
3  See generally MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND 
POLICY (2016) (discussing many types of investment schemes and institutions, 
such as pension funds, securities firms, mutual funds, private equity funds and 
derivatives, having shares as part of their asset portfolio or as their underlying 
asset). 
4  In corporate law, constitutional documents are certain documents required 
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that it is a patently undetailed agreement,5 augmented only to a lim-
ited extent by statutory provisions.6  Furthermore, the very nature 
of the obligation toward shareholders is “residual,” meaning that it 
derives from the constantly fluctuating difference between the cor-
poration’s assets and liabilities.  Due to these factors, shareholders’ 
legal position cannot ever be well-defined in advance.  Based on 
what concepts, doctrines and principles should we examine share-
related issues?  As this Article reveals, not only contract law is un-
suited to explain shares; so are the fields of property, trust and fi-
                                                   
in order to create a corporation.  Usually, they govern some fundamental aspects 
of the corporation’s identity and affairs.  They are also a normative source (most-
ly, a contract) binding the corporation and its residual claimants, the first of 
whom are also its founders.  See, e.g., DGCL § 101(a) (stating that every corpora-
tion shall have a certificate of incorporation); STAAR Surgical Co. v. Waggoner, 
588 A.2d 1130, 1136 (Del. 1991) (“[A] corporate charter is . . . a contract between 
. . . the corporation and its shareholders. . . . The charter is also a contract among 
the shareholders themselves.”); Companies Act, 5759-1999, §§ 15, 17(a), SH No. 
1711 p. 189 (Isr.) [hereinafter: Israel Companies Act] (“Every company shall have 
an article of incorporation . . . .”; “The article of incorporation is legally a contract 
between the company and its shareholders and between [the shareholders] them-
selves.”).  Constitutional documents are sometimes called “organizational docu-
ments,” see, e.g., Sylvia Ann Mayer & Manesh Jiten Shah, I Wish I May, I Wish I 
Might... File Chapter 11 Tonight: Authorization and D&O Considerations When Filing 
Chapter 11, WEIL BANKRUPTCY BLOG 2 (Nov. 2010), http://business-finance-
restructuring.weil.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Mayer_BK10_Paper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q5SZ-Y5KD] (“[T]he organizational documents (such as the 
charter, articles of incorporation, bylaws, limited liability company (“LLC”) 
agreement, or partnership agreement) . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
5  In Delaware, the list of mandatory clauses for a certificate of incorporation 
is very short: the corporation’s name, address, goals (“The nature of the business 
or purposes to be conducted or promoted.”), authorized share capital and the 
names and addresses of the corporation’s founders.  See DGCL § 102.  In Israel, 
only four clauses are mandatory in every article of incorporation (the sole consti-
tutional document required under the Israel Companies Act): the company’s 
name, goals, authorized share capital and type of liability limitation (if any).  Ad-
ditionally, the article of incorporation has to be signed by the company’s founders 
(its first shareholders).  See Israel Companies Act §§ 18, 23. 
6  Several sections of the Delaware corporate statute deal with shares, see 
DGCL §§ 102, 109, 151–174, 201–205, 211–233, 241–245, in addition to other sec-
tions where share law issues are intermittently mixed in with others, such as the 
merger and dissolution provisions in DGCL §§ 251–267, 271–285.  For statutory 
share law in Israel, see Israel Companies Act §§ 1, 15–24, 33–35, 57–91, 127–139, 
176–193, 285–313.  Importantly, most of these sections contain fairly broad state-
ments and do not attempt to provide rules of conduct or decision even for known 
types of share-related disputes, such as share dilution, withholding of dividends, 
or unfair prejudice.  Similarly, none of them explain how the rights attached to 
shares are different from those attached to any other security or corporate obliga-
tion; none of these provisions address the unique nature of residual claims and 
the problems they give rise to.  The same is true of constitutional documents, even 
when they are more detailed than the minimum statutory requirements. 
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duciary law.  Presumably, the share is a legal mystery.  We are 
seemingly unable to answer even a simple question:  “why do 
shares have value?”  Yet, around US$80 trillion hinges on our an-
swer.7 
One reason for this gap is habit and routine.  Dividends and 
merger proceeds get paid, or not; shareholder voting effects 
change, or not.  It often feels as if corporations’ successes and fail-
ures translate directly enough into shareholders’ pockets.  The 
most familiar perception of shares comes from the secondary mar-
ket:  the trading of shares in a stock exchange, with their prices go-
ing up and down.  Not enough attention is paid to the underlying 
nature of shares, and the rules and principles governing them—in 
short, to share law. 
However, such attention is highly necessary.  It is required in 
order to grapple with very salient questions, such as shareholders’ 
power compared to that of directors, or the position of non-
shareholder constituencies.  Additionally, things do go wrong with-
in the relationships that shareholders are parties to:  for many rea-
sons, the corporation’s fortunes might not translate into those of its 
shareholders, or part of them.  That happens constantly, and in 
surprising ways.  Due to their unusual characteristics, shares give 
rise to a very wide range of possible situations.  To realize how 
broad that range is, it might be beneficial to take a look around the 
globe. 
In September 2017, the Supreme Court of Israel issued its deci-
sion in General Guardian v. Co-Op Blue Square Services Cooperative 
Ltd. (In Liquidation).8  In that judgment, the Court held that the eco-
nomic rights of shareholders cannot be taken away from them sole-
ly because they cannot be located.  The Court ordered that, instead, 
those rights (here, a liquidating dividend in cash, totaling approx-
imately US$15 million) will be held in trust, for the benefit of the 
unknown shareholders, for an unlimited period of time, to be 
claimed by the unknown shareholders when they do appear. 
The Co-Op decision sheds profound light on the fundamental 
concepts relating to shares, not only in Israel, but under percep-
tions that evolved globally, since the birth of modern corporations. 
The decision is illuminating precisely because the Court struggled 
7  See supra note 2. 
8  CA 238/16 Gen. Guardian v. Co-Op Blue Square Servs. Coop. Ltd. (In Liq-
uidation) (Sept. 10, 2017) (Isr.) [hereinafter: Co-Op], 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/16/380/002/N21/16002380.N21.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G5VJ-7K6Y]. 
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to reach this outcome.  Israel has a developed economy, with a 
common law system9 featuring highly sophisticated bodies of cor-
porate and other private law.10  Yet, the Court could find no statu-
tory, case law or contractual provisions clearly establishing that 
shareholders are entitled to the economic rights arising from their 
shares, and that this entitlement is unlimited in time.  The opinion 
of the Court, by Judge David Mintz, relied on an amalgamation of 
written law provisions to reach the result.11  In a concurrence,12 
Judge Daphne Barak-Erez attempted to formulate a broader prin-
ciple:  share rights are “property” rights, so that, like other types of 
property, they enjoy strong, constitutional protections and cannot 
be simply taken away from their owners. 
In fact, the Co-Op Court operated as a court of equity, treating 
shareholders’ claims as equitable rights, with the attendant results. 
Mainly, in this case, shareholder rights were regarded as quasi-
property rights,13 similar to (albeit different than) a trust benefi-
ciary’s rights.  Like other equitable rights, those rights are both ob-
ligatory, toward the corporation; and quasi-proprietary, toward 
9  See, e.g., AMIR N. LICHT, DINEI EMUNA’UT: HOVAT HA’EMUN BA’TA’AGID 
U’BA’DIN HA’KLALI [FIDUCIARY LAW: THE DUTY OF LOYALTY IN THE CORPORATION AND
IN THE GENERAL LAW] 23–24 (2013) (“[T]he question of Israeli law’s classification 
into a legal family, if it was ever controversial, is no longer in dispute.  The an-
swer is clear: Israeli law is common law . . . .”). 
10  See generally INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL (Amos Shapira & Keren 
C. DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995); ALON KAPLAN, ISRAELI BUSINESS LAW (1999); Itai Fieg-
enbaum & Amir N. Licht, Corporate Law of Israel (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 372, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3050329
[https://perma.cc/LK8K-8CT7].
11  But see infra pp. 306–07 (describing how the equity approach, which the 
Court perceives as obvious, “operates behind the scenes” of the decision and mo-
tivates the outcome). 
12  See Co-Op at 28. 
13  The concurrence, id., uses the term “property rights”, but that wording 
(which does not appear in the opinion of the Court) is inaccurate.  See infra Part 5.2 
(explaining that shareholder rights toward the corporation’s net worth are not 
property rights under property law).  Alternatively, the concurrence might have 
referred not to the rights contained in the share, but to shareholders’ rights toward 
the share.  The latter are, indeed, property rights.  See infra pp. 275–76.  Of course, 
this does not resolve the legal content of the share itself.  In Co-Op, shareholders’ 
property rights toward their shares were undisputed; the issue was their right to 
receive a portion of the corporation’s assets, which is one of the rights embedded 
in the share, and is governed by equity-based share law.  Finally, the concurrence 
might have referred to “property rights” in a constitutional law sense, which is 
not congruent with private law classifications, and might include all manner of 
economic rights, whether proprietary, equitable, or obligatory.  In constitutional 
and human rights law, such an approach is generally warranted. 
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the shareholder’s respective portion of the corporation’s net worth. 
Indeed, net worth is also known as “shareholders’ equity.”  That is 
one verification of the link between shares and equity; this Article 
details many others.  Current approaches to shares rely on various 
legal disciplines, but none of these correctly and fully explain the 
share phenomenon.  Equity is the basis of share law, both in posi-
tive law (people act according to this approach since the birth of 
modern corporations14) and normatively.  The rights, and even the 
existence, of shares and shareholders cannot be adequately ex-
plained any other way.  Especially when dealing with such extent 
of capital and such a scope of human interests, it is crucial to un-
derstand where shares come from, which actions pertaining to 
them are permissible, and what the parties to share-borne relation-
ships may expect. 
This Article weaves together theoretical, doctrinal and compar-
ative approaches, producing a consistent model of corporate law 
and its subdivisions.  To that end, this Article mainly surveys two 
jurisdictions:  the United States, the prominent arena of business 
and legal activity in the world, and within it, as pertains to corpo-
rate law, mainly Delaware; and Israel, a country with a well-
developed commercial sphere, legal system and common law ju-
risprudence, where the Co-Op case took place.  Occasionally, this 
Article turns to other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, 
which is historically the source of both American and Israeli law. 
Many of the core concepts of corporate and other private law are 
very similar among these jurisdictions—which makes any differ-
ences all the more telling. 
The issues that comprise share law have been with us since the 
dawn of corporations.  This Article, for the first time, introduces 
the concept of share law as a separate classification.  It explores 
both the theoretical foundations of share law, and many of the 
practical topics it encompasses.  This Article aims to assist future 
inquiries by businesspeople, investors, lawyers, judges and schol-
ars, as it presents a unified framework for resolving the many 
questions that emerge from the share phenomenon.  While doing 
so, this Article also provides a more nuanced understanding of 
such areas as corporate personhood and corporate purpose—other 
paradigms that give rise to some of the most pressing issues facing 
today’s corporate jurisprudence. 
14  See infra Part 6.3. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/6
2018] Share Law 263 
2. THE CO-OP CASE:  FACTS, LAW AND JUDGMENT
Before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the land 
was under British mandate rule.  British law in force, which was 
later absorbed into the law of Israel,15 enabled people to start a 
regular business company; that was, as it still is in Israel, the most 
common type of corporation.  The law also afforded promoters the 
option of establishing another, more unique type of corporation:  a 
cooperative.  This type of entity, having strong roots in the U.K. it-
self,16 is a for-profit,17 separate legal person,18 with optional limited 
liability for shareholders.19  These characteristics make a coopera-
tive similar to other for-profit corporations.  However, a coopera-
tive also has several unique traits, intended, as its name implies, to 
foster social cooperation among its shareholders or “members.”  
These include, among other things, restrictions on the maximum 
stake of the cooperative’s outstanding shares any single sharehold-
er can own (set at 20%);20 a mandatory “one shareholder, one vote” 
rule;21 and a rule excluding cooperative shares from being subject 
to a lien,22 apparently intended to restrict their transferability to 
outsiders not as committed to the cooperative’s goals as voluntary 
members are. 
One of those corporations, established in 1942 and continuing 
to exist in Israel,23 is Co-Op Blue Square Services Cooperative Ltd. 
15  See Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948, § 11, O.B. (Official Bul-
letin) No. 2 p. 1 (Isr.) (the first legislative act enacted in the State of Israel; this sec-
tion declaring that the existing law of the land continues to be valid, as part of the 
law of Israel). 
16  See generally JOHN F. WILSON ET AL., BUILDING CO-OPERATION: A BUSINESS 
HISTORY OF THE CO-OPERATIVE GROUP, 1863-2013 (2013). 
17  See Cooperatives Ordinance, §§ 39, 40, HEI (Laws of the Land of Israel) 
Vol. 1 p. 336 (1933) (Isr.) [hereinafter: Israel Cooperatives Ordinance] (providing 
rules in regard to the cooperative’s profits and the permissibility of various ac-
tions pertaining to them).  Alternatively, a cooperative may be described as a 
“mixed-purpose” corporation; one purpose within the mix is the pursuit of profit. 
18  See id. at § 21. 
19  See id. at § 4. 
20  See id. at § 5(1). 
21  See id. at § 16. 
22  See id. at § 25. 
23 See Cooperative Search, MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, 
https://apps.moital.gov.il/CooperativeSocieties [https://perma.cc/8E32-6EFH] 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (search for cooperative number 570004465; indicating 
that the cooperative was founded on Mar. 4, 1942 and is in liquidation proceed-
ings). 
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(Co-Op).  This entity was in the business of food retail and distri-
bution of produce; before its liquidation, it mainly operated 
through subsidiaries, many of them regular commercial compa-
nies.24  As the years passed, Co-Op amassed substantial earnings: 
during its liquidation proceedings, its assets were sold for over 1.3 
billion NIS (New Israeli Shekels),25 equivalent in 2017 rates to 
about US$370 million.26 
In 2002, Co-Op entered into court-ordered liquidation.  The 
reasons for that decision are not pertinent for current purposes, but 
importantly, it is a non-bankruptcy liquidation:  the corporation 
maintained a positive net worth (shareholders’ equity), on the or-
der of the sum of its assets.  A cooperative is a for-profit, or at least 
mixed-purpose corporation; incidental to that, the persons entitled 
to receive its net worth, when it is distributed, are its sharehold-
ers.27  Accordingly, the liquidator, appointed by the District Court 
of Tel Aviv, set out to distribute among shareholders the cash pro-
ceeds, gained from the sale of the corporation’s assets.  Most 
shareholders were indeed located and received their due fraction 
of the corporation’s net worth.  As a matter of course, that fraction 
derives from the relation between the number of shares owned by 
the shareholder and the number of outstanding shares. 
There was a problem, however, which ended up at the heart of 
the case.  Due to the age of the corporation and the time passed 
since the allocation of most of its shares—which were not publicly 
traded—it turned out to be impossible to contact the owners of 
about 10% of the outstanding shares.  Many simply changed their 
addresses.  It is naturally apparent that many shareholders passed 
away; this does not materially change the legal analysis, since their 
24  See infra note 31, para. 3. 
25  See Brief for Appellant, para. 6, CA 238/16 Gen. Guardian v. Co-Op Blue 
Square Servs. Coop. Ltd. (In Liquidation) (Isr.), 
http://www.justice.gov.il/Pubilcations/Articles/Documents/KO_OP_FINAL.pd
f [https://perma.cc/8JWX-WUH5]. 
26 See Exchange Rates, BANK OF ISRAEL, 
http://www.boi.org.il/en/Markets/ExchangeRates/Pages/Default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/P9XT-PKWL] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (search for the ex-
change rate on Sept. 10, 2017; indicating that on the day of the Co-Op decision, the 
exchange rate was 3.504 NIS for 1 U.S. dollar). 
27  See Israel Cooperatives Ordinance §§ 39, 40; Companies Ordinance (New 
Form), 5743-1983, § 284, DMI (Laws of the State of Israel) No. 37 p. 761 (Isr.) [here-
inafter: Israel Companies Ordinance] (providing rules in regard to the distribution 
of profits to shareholders, during the corporation’s ongoing existence or during 
liquidation). 
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claims passed on to their heirs.28  The liquidator did manage to lo-
cate some previously unknown shareholders, and at present they 
continue to show up, gradually.29 
By 2015, the liquidation proceedings seemingly reached an im-
passe.  All of the corporation’s assets had been sold.  The liquidat-
ing dividend was fully distributed to the known shareholders.  It 
was perceived by many, including the liquidator and representa-
tives of the known shareholders, that the chances of locating more 
unknown shareholders were becoming slimmer as time passed—
although previously unknown shareholders did continue to show 
up, at however seemingly slow rate.30  In 2015, the liquidator filed 
a motion with the lower court, the District Court of Tel Aviv, ask-
ing to end the liquidation proceedings, wind up the corporation 
and, most importantly, order the distribution of all remaining 
funds between the known shareholders, irrevocably nullifying the 
claims of currently unknown shareholders, even if they show up in 
the future.  The known shareholders—the only ones appearing be-
fore the court—agreed to this, unsurprisingly.  The lower court 
granted the motion.31  Its decision did not include substantive dis-
cussion on the merits of the unknown shareholders’ legal or equi-
table rights; rather, it was based on practical considerations, pri-
marily the seeming inability to locate any more unknown 
shareholders expeditiously enough, in light of the liquidation 
stretching out for many years.32  The lower court’s decision also 
took somewhat for granted the link between winding up the cor-
poration and distributing the remaining funds to the known share-
holders.  It did not expound on another possibility:  depositing the 
remaining funds in trust, for the benefit of the unknown share-
holders—although the appellant did raise this option before the 
lower court.33 
The General Guardian, an agency of the Israel Ministry of Jus-
28  See Inheritance Act, 5725-1965, § 1, SH No. 446 p. 663 (Isr.) (“Upon a per-
son’s death his estate passes to his heirs.”). 
29  See Co-Op, para. 5. 
30  See id. 
31  See LC (Liquidation Case) (TA) 1153/02 Co-Op Blue Square Servs. Coop. 
Ltd. v. Levitt (Nov. 26, 2015) (Isr.), 
https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/mechozi/ME-02-1153-521.htm 
[https://perma.cc/L7JD-JM44]. 
32  See id., para. 10. 
33  See id., para. 9. 
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tice entrusted by statute34 with representing the interests of proper-
ty owners who are unidentified or unable to appear in court, time-
ly appealed to the Supreme Court.  The appellant also moved to 
stay the distribution to the known shareholders, until the appeal is 
decided.  The Court granted this stay, soon after the appeal was 
filed.35  The amount corresponding to the unknown shareholders’ 
claims totaled 53 million NIS36 (approximately US$15 million in 
2017 rates37).  At this stage, the unknown shareholders numbered 
2,600,38 giving each a claim of about US$5,700.  If the lower court’s 
judgment was to stand, they faced an irreversible loss of this 
amount.39 
In September 2017, the Supreme Court issued its judgment in 
the case.40  The opinion of the Court was written by Judge David 
Mintz, a 2017 appointee to the Court, who previously served on 
the District Court of Jerusalem and is renowned for his expertise in 
bankruptcy law.41  Judge Yoram Danziger, the most senior member 
of the three-judge panel, joined in Mintz’s opinion.42 
The Court’s analysis begins with a survey of the law of cooper-
atives, noting, as mentioned above, the dual nature of this type of 
corporation, which harbors both social and economic purposes.43 
Importantly, the Court then mentions that a cooperative’s exist-
ence, like that of other corporations, is based on a constitutional 
34  See General Guardian Act, 5738-1978, SH No. 883 p. 61 (Isr.). 
35  See CA 238/16 Gen. Guardian v. Co-Op Blue Square Servs. Coop. Ltd. (In 
Liquidation) (Feb. 2, 2016) (Isr.), 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/16/380/002/O05/16002380.O05.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MY5P-WCU3]. 
36  See supra note 31, para. 9. 
37  See supra note 26. 
38  See Co-Op, para. 5. 
39  If the funds had been distributed among the known shareholders, then 
even if the lower court decision would have been later found to be in error, there 
is absolutely no procedural mechanism, either in Israel or in other countries, in-
cluding the U.S. and U.K., that enables one (such as a previously unknown share-
holder) to pursue an action seeking remuneration from a very large number of 
dispersed people (such as the tens of thousands known shareholders).  A class ac-
tion only works the other way around. 
40  Co-Op, supra note 8. 
41  See Justices and Registrars of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL, 
https://supreme.court.gov.il/sites/en/Pages/Justices.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/X2ZN-ZTBS] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018). 
42  See Co-Op at 27–28. 
43  See id., para. 19. 
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document—the article of incorporation.44  This relates to the con-
tractual approach to shares, discussed below.45  The Court goes on 
to mention the strong link between company law and cooperative 
law, stating that doctrines from other areas of corporate law may 
be “imported” into cooperative law.46  This is consistent with the 
methodology employed in this Article, viewing corporate law as a 
general field, with different types of corporations, having similar 
traits, entitled to similar treatment.  In other words, although Co-
Op involves a unique type of corporation, its lessons are fully ap-
plicable to “regular” companies and other corporations. 
The Court then delves into a prolonged analysis of various 
provisions, gathered from cooperative law, bankruptcy law (occu-
pying a large part of the opinion, even though the Court acknowl-
edges the large positive net worth of the corporation, and that 
shareholders are its intended recipients;47 this analysis might be 
expected, considering that most liquidation activity arises in bank-
ruptcy), comparative law from the U.K. and U.S., Hebrew law, and 
even administrative law, but importantly, by the end of that part of 
the opinion,48 the outcome remains to be clarified.  Unsurprisingly, 
neither of these sources provide clear rules as to the unique situa-
tion involving unlocated shareholders in a liquidating corporation, 
entitled to large sums of money and facing (unbeknownst to any of 
them) a motion to distribute those funds among other, known 
shareholders. 
Two statutory provisions mentioned by the Court come close to 
providing a decisive rule in the case.  The first, Section 372 of the 
Israel Companies Ordinance, states that if some of the liquidating 
company’s funds, held by the liquidator, are not duly claimed by 
anyone within six months, they shall be deposited in a bank ac-
count; if the claimant later appears, the funds shall then be paid; 
that section places no time limit on making the claim.49  However, 
the Court mentions that non-shareholder creditors’ claims are time-
limited, by other statutory provisions, which the Court declines to 
apply to shareholders.50  Why are shareholders different?  Also, 
44  See id., para. 20. 
45  See infra Part 5.1. 
46  See Co-Op, para. 21. 
47  See id., para. 2. 
48  See id., paras. 25–64. 
49  See Israel Companies Ordinance § 372. 
50  The Court simply states that “a shareholder is not required to file a proof 
of claim, since he is not considered as a creditor of the company but a participant 
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what if Section 372 did not exist, or if it was less sufficiently word-
ed (common predicaments of statutory law)?  The second statutory 
provision, Section 248 of the Israel Companies Ordinance, deals 
with distributions to shareholders during the company’s liquida-
tion, ordering as follows:  “A sum that a [shareholder] is entitled to 
due to being a [shareholder] . . . shall be taken into account in re-
gard to adjusting the rights of all [shareholders] among them-
selves.”51  The Court invokes this provision to state that “there is 
no place to benefit one shareholder at the expense of another.”52 
Again, besides merely quoting the statute, the Court does not ex-
plain how shareholders are different than other creditors.53  Yet, 
this short provision does allude to an important principle of equi-
ty-based share law:  the equality between identical shares (and 
hence, between equal shareholders). 
The Court then announces the result:  the lower court’s deci-
sion is overturned.  The monetary rights of the unknown share-
holders shall be held in trust, by the appellant, for each sharehold-
er to receive whenever in the future they may appear.54 
In a short concurrence,55 Judge Daphne Barak-Erez joins Judge 
Mintz’s opinion.  She also offers another explanation for the eter-
nality of shareholders’ rights:  “The rights of the unknown share-
holders are property rights for all intents and purposes.  These are 
fundamental rights, which today even enjoy constitutional protec-
tion.”56  The concurrence also points out that “the known share-
                                                   
in it.  Therefore, applying here the provisions relevant to a “creditor” would be 
problematic.”  Co-Op, para. 66.  The term “participant” is synonymous with 
“shareholder,” see id., para. 67.  The Court does not elaborate on what gives rise to 
this distinction between “creditor” and “shareholder.” 
51  Israel Companies Ordinance § 248. 
52  Co-Op, para. 66. 
53  Notably, the pari passu equality rule, which Israel Companies Ordinance § 
248 secures to shareholders, also applies to creditors under general and bankrupt-
cy law.  At the bottom line, the Court’s conclusion in paras. 65–67 of the opinion is 
simply that “creditors” must file a proof of claim in liquidation proceedings, and 
have a limited period of time to do so, while “shareholders” are different in both 
respects.  This conclusion is not explained by the statutory language or the Court’s 
discussion, but see infra pp. 306–07 (describing how the equity approach, which 
the Court perceives as obvious, “operates behind the scenes” of the decision and 
motivates the outcome). 
54  See Co-Op, para. 70. 
55  See id. at 28. 
56  Id.  Regarding the use of the term “property rights,” see supra note 13.  The 
constitutional protection referred to comes from Basic Law: Human Dignity and 
Liberty, § 3, SH No. 1391 p. 150 (Isr.) (“There shall be no violation of the property 
of a person.”). 
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holders never had any legitimate expectation grounded in law to 
receive more than their respective fraction of the cooperative’s as-
sets.  They are not the unknown shareholders’ natural “heirs” or 
their partners.”57  This, again, is an allusion to principles of equity, 
such as the maxim “equity delights in equality.”58  In other words, 
there is no difference between a known and an unknown share-
holder, at least none that justifies forfeiting the latter’s rights and 
giving them to the former. 
This is a remarkable decision, reached from a remarkable fac-
tual background.  It warrants further discussion.  What is the fun-
damental basis of Co-Op—and indeed, of shareholder rights and 
shares generally? 
3. CLASSIFICATIONS IN CORPORATE LAW AND THE UNIQUENESS OF 
SHARES 
The difficulty faced by the Court in Co-Op arises, to a large ex-
tent, from a gap in the way we currently classify the structure of 
corporate law.  This Article explains how to close that gap.  Its ex-
istence is somewhat perplexing, because lawyers must classify, and 
do so all the time.  Peter Birks wrote that “taxonomy is the founda-
tion of most of the science . . . .  Without it there is only a chaos of 
unsorted information . . . .  A sound taxonomy . . . is an essential 
precondition of rationality. . . . Abolition of categories would entail 
abolition of thought.”59  Pertinently, he warned that “[a]ll these are 
wanting in common law systems.”60  Corporate lawyers, in particu-
lar, classify a lot of things:  is the claim derivative or direct?  Is the 
transaction a merger or an acquisition?  Was the breach of a duty of 
loyalty or care?  Which statutory sections govern the current situa-
tion?  Yet, the question is whether they are classifying enough. 
Today, when we discuss corporate law, we often perceive one 
class of matters to “lie at its heart,” or even amount to all of corpo-
rate law.61  These matters can be termed corporate fiduciary law.62  It 
57  Co-Op at 28. 
58  MICHAEL LEVENSTEIN, MAXIMS OF EQUITY 103 (2014). 
59  Peter Birks, Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy, 26 U. W. 
AUSTL. L. REV. 1, 3–7 (1996). 
60  Id. at 4. 
61  An example of this partial view is provided by Goshen and Hannes, who 
dramatically announce “the death of corporate law,” while actually describing 
some changes in a specific area of corporate law—the balance of power between 
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is the law governing the relationships between a corporation and 
its fiduciaries, that is, the people who owe it fiduciary duties. 
These include directors, other officers (such as managers), control-
ling shareholders and others.  Such well-discussed and litigated 
topics as self-interested transactions,63 appropriation of corporate 
opportunities,64 and executive compensation65 are part of corporate 
fiduciary law.  Also within this field are some structural issues, 
such as the prerequisites for a new director appointment, the oper-
ation of board committees, or the roles of independent directors. 
Indeed, corporate fiduciary law is a necessary, defining com-
ponent of corporate law, and there is a fundamental reason for 
that:  every corporation must have at least one fiduciary at any giv-
en moment.  A corporation is a person, but not a natural person.  It 
does not have eyes and hands, or any other bodily and cognitive 
capacities, entirely of its own.  Therefore, it always has to operate 
through someone else (the fiduciary), whom by design it entrusts 
with acting in its benefit.  While part of corporate law, corporate 
fiduciary law is also part of the broader field of fiduciary law.66 
The norms governing trustees, lawyers and many others,67 even in 
non-corporate contexts, are part of fiduciary law.  The unique duty 
characterizing fiduciary law is the duty of loyalty.  Its underlying 
theme is the fiduciary principle:  a fiduciary must single-mindedly 
act to the advantage of the beneficiary, without being swayed by 
directors, activist shareholders and courts.  See Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, 
The Death of Corporate Law (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 402, 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3171023 
[https://perma.cc/8EFR-CGMG].  That article treats a narrowing in the scope of 
corporate fiduciary law (at least as it is traditionally perceived) as a decline of all 
corporate law.  In fact, shares and shareholders, with their voting and other rights, 
are also part of corporate law, which is alive and well. 
62  See, e.g., David Kershaw, The Path of Corporate Fiduciary Law, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. 
& BUS. 395 (2012); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Fiduciary Principles 
and Delaware Corporation Law: Searching for the Optimal Balance by Understanding 
That the World is Not (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper 
No. 40, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3044477 
[https://perma.cc/ZBL3-UKS7] (using the term “corporate fiduciary law”). 
63  See generally WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 292 (5th ed., 2016). 
64  See generally id. at 328. 
65  See generally id. at 343. 
66  Many volumes are devoted to general, rather than only corporate, fiduci-
ary law.  See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW (2011); LICHT, supra note 9; 
LEONARD I. ROTMAN, FIDUCIARY LAW (2005). 
67  For a partial list, see ROTMAN, supra note 66, at 15. 
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any other interest.68  This is a much higher standard of behavior 
than that pertaining to regular, arm’s length obligations, where 
each party is free to benefit itself.  It arises when the fiduciary 
agrees to undertake this position, which involves the power to uni-
laterally affect the beneficiary’s affairs and legal standing.  The fi-
duciary also has absolute advantage in information over the bene-
ficiary.  Due to these power and information asymmetries, the 
regular law of obligations is insufficient, and a heightened type of 
duty is invoked to protect the beneficiary’s interests, and more 
generally, justice and fairness.  As a result, fiduciary law is known 
for its strictness toward fiduciaries.69  Given this rigidity, corporate 
68  See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989) (“[I]t is 
elemental that a fiduciary owes a duty of undivided and undiluted loyalty to 
those whose interests the fiduciary is to protect . . . .  This is a sensitive and “in-
flexible” rule of fidelity, barring not only blatant self-dealing, but also requiring 
avoidance of situations in which a fiduciary’s personal interest possibly conflicts 
with the interest of those owed a fiduciary duty . . . .  Included within this rule’s 
broad scope is every situation in which a fiduciary, who is bound to single-
mindedly pursue the interests of those to whom a duty of loyalty is owed, deals 
with a person “in such close relation [to the fiduciary] . . . that possible advantage 
to such other person might . . . consciously or unconsciously” influence the fiduci-
ary’s judgment . . . .” (third and fourth alterations in original) (second brackets in 
original) (citations omitted)); Bristol & W. Bldg. Soc’y v. Mothew [1996] EWCA 
(Civ) 533, [1998] Ch 1 at 18 (appeal taken from Eng.) (describing the conditions 
that give rise to a fiduciary relationship, stating that “[a] fiduciary is someone 
who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another . . . in circumstances which 
give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence.”; also describing the main obli-
gations imposed on fiduciaries, including that “[t]he principal is entitled to the 
single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary.”).  This Article generally employs the 
American view of the scope of fiduciary duties, subsuming both loyalty and care.  
In other jurisdictions, fiduciary law might be understood to encompass only the 
duty of loyalty.  See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Is the Corporate Director’s Duty of 
Care a “Fiduciary” Duty? Does It Matter?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1027, 1028 (2013) 
(“[U]nlike the United States, other common law jurisdictions including the United 
Kingdom, Australia, and Canada generally do not conceptualize the duty of care 
as “fiduciary” in nature.”). 
69  See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“A public policy, 
existing through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human 
characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate 
officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance 
of his duty . . . .  The rule, inveterate and uncompromising in its rigidity, does not 
rest upon the narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation resulting 
from a betrayal of confidence, but upon a broader foundation of a wise public pol-
icy that, for the purpose of removing all temptation, extinguishes all possibility of 
profit flowing from a breach of the confidence imposed by the fiduciary rela-
tion.”); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“Many forms of con-
duct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbid-
den to those bound by fiduciary ties.  A trustee is held to something stricter than 
the morals of the market place.  Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor 
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.  As to this there has devel-
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fiduciary law employs mechanisms, such as the business judgment 
rule, meant to apply when the duty of loyalty has not been 
breached, in order to promote the dynamics of corporate life and 
other policy considerations that arise in the corporate context.70 
However, corporate fiduciary law is only one part of corporate 
law.  The fiduciary-corporation relationship is one of the two main 
relationships that uniquely define corporate law.  When classifying 
corporate law, we also encounter a set of issues that are non-
fiduciary or only partly fiduciary in nature.  We talk about these 
topics in law school classes, practice them as lawyers, adjudicate 
them and draft statutes that govern them.  These issues are at the 
heart of corporate law just as much as corporate fiduciary law is. 
They deal with the second group of persons71 that must exist in re-
lation to every corporation.  In the broadest terms, that group may 
be called “residual claimants.”  Every corporation, at any given 
moment, has at least one of those.72 
The underlying reason for this is that a corporation’s life can 
end, as it often does, whether through merger or liquidation. 
oped a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.”). 
70  See, e.g., Hamermesh & Strine, supra note 62, at 11 (“One of the earliest re-
finements in Delaware corporate fiduciary law was the articulation of the business 
judgment rule.”).  The article also discusses the rule’s application and some of its 
justifications. 
71  In most corporations, the same person can be a member of both groups, 
that is, a fiduciary for the corporation and its residual claimant, at the same time. 
72  The absolute necessity of both fiduciaries and residual claimants can also 
be stated as follows: unlike a natural person, who is under no inherent duty to en-
ter into any contract, a corporation, by design, must be party to at least two con-
tracts, at any moment of its existence: one with its fiduciary (or fiduciaries) and 
the other with its residual claimant(s).  This stems from first principles, described 
in this Part of the Article (the corporation, not being a natural person, is only able 
to act through others; the need to determine who would be entitled to receive the 
corporation’s net worth at the end of its life), and from written law.  See, e.g., 
DGCL §§ 101(a) (stating that every corporation shall have a certificate of incorpo-
ration), 151(b) (instructing that after share redemption, the corporation must have 
at least one outstanding share); STAAR Surgical Co. v. Waggoner, 588 A.2d 1130, 
1136 (Del. 1991) (“[A] corporate charter is . . . a contract between . . . the corpora-
tion and its shareholders.”); Israel Companies Act §§ 15, 17 (stating that every 
company shall have an article of incorporation, and that it is a contract between 
the company and its shareholders); DGCL § 141(b) (stating that every corpora-
tion’s board must include at least one director); Israel Companies Act § 219(b) 
(stating that every company must have at least one director).  Regarding the con-
tractual aspect of the fiduciary-corporation relationship, see, e.g., Bristol v. Mothew, 
[1998] Ch 1 at 18 (stating that the fiduciary position has to be “undertaken” by the 
fiduciary), meaning that the relationship is based on agreement—while also, by 
definition, absorbing the norms of fiduciary law.  Some of the fiduciary’s “em-
ployment contract” may also be, and often is, in writing. 
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When that happens, the corporation’s interests (assets and non-
economic interests alike) do not disappear.  If the corporation has 
liabilities (including both economic and non-economic obligations), 
then according to general law,73 its interests must first go toward 
satisfying those.  Yet only rarely, if ever, do a corporation’s inter-
ests precisely equal its liabilities.  There must be some person enti-
tled to receive the difference, or “residual.”74  That person is the re-
sidual claimant. 
Crucially, a corporation has residual claimants throughout its 
life, not only at or near its end.  To explain this, the analysis above 
needs to be expanded.  The phenomenon can be first explained in 
contractual terms:  when a corporation is formed, its founders also 
choose its first residual claimants (usually themselves); that choice 
is found in the constitutional documents.75  Put another way, the 
persons entering into that particular contract accept, as part of their 
contractual bargain, the fact that they are the residual claimants. 
Conversely, parties to other relationships with the corporation ac-
cept the fact that they are not the residual claimants.  Second, the 
continuous, indispensable existence of residual claimants can be 
explained in terms of corporate purpose-setting:  someone has to de-
termine the ends toward which the corporation will act.76  This, 
too, is part of a contractual bargain:  the person who becomes a 
party to the constitutional documents agrees to accept a position as 
determiner of corporate purpose.  Other creditors are not in that 
position, nor should they be, as long as the obligations they are en-
titled to are being met.  Furthermore, in the case of for-profit cor-
porations, the residual claimant is also the indirect economic bene-
73  That is, law external to corporate law.  In this sense, general law also in-
cludes bankruptcy law, which often dictates where corporations’ assets go when 
their lives end.  For discussion of the relation between general law and corporate 
law, see infra notes 77, 142. 
74  The residual might be negative.  In non-limited liability corporations, the 
analysis remains the same: residual claimants are entitled to receive the residual, 
which happens to mean they will be burdened with new obligations, rather than 
acquiring new rights.  In limited liability corporations, when the residual is nega-
tive, residual claimants are legally entitled to forego it. 
75  See supra note 5 (noting that constitutional documents must specify the 
names of the first shareholders).  With the transferability of shares, the residual 
claim passes on to each subsequent shareholder. 
76  This is done when a promoter (and soon-to-be residual claimant) selects a 
certain form of incorporation, with a known, fixed purpose (a for-profit, nonprof-
it, or mixed-purpose corporation), see infra note 142.  Additionally, and subject to 
that fixed purpose, the residual claimant specifies the corporation’s goals in its 
constitutional documents, see supra note 5. 
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ficiary of pursuing those ends.  From a deontological viewpoint, as 
long as the rights of no one else are violated,77 there is nothing 
wrong with having a person determine the corporation’s purpose 
and goals and indirectly enjoy their attainment. 
In a sense, a natural person can also be said to have, at any giv-
en moment, “residual claimants”:  the person’s presumptive heirs.  
They, too, are entitled to receive the future decedent’s “net worth” 
(as their claim ranks below that of creditors) when the decedent’s 
life ends.  However, a natural person is different from a corpora-
tion in this regard, since heirs have no right to control the affairs of 
the future decedent inter vivos.  This results from an important ex-
77  Indeed, by definition, residual claimants cannot bypass, or impair the 
rights of, non-residual creditors.  Residual claimants always rank below creditors 
in the priority order of claims for the corporation’s assets.  The corporation must 
fulfill, or at least be able to fulfill, all of its obligations to creditors, before it is le-
gally allowed to hand out any economic benefit to its residual claimants.  Fur-
thermore, residual claimants themselves cannot validly do anything (such as 
adopting a resolution in the shareholder meeting) that unilaterally impairs the 
content of the corporation’s obligation to a creditor.  These facts stem from the 
very concept of residuality.  They are also protected by mandatory provisions of 
positive law, including general law (requiring every corporation, as any other 
person, to meet its obligations), bankruptcy law (placing residual claimants at the 
lowest level of priority, dictating that if the corporation’s obligations to creditors 
are not fully met, residual claimants are not entitled to any value) and corporate 
law, see, e.g., DGCL §§ 160(a), 170–174 (establishing mandatory rules to determine 
when a corporation is allowed to make a distribution to its shareholders, requir-
ing that distributions not “impair” the corporation’s capital, or that they be made 
out of the corporation’s profits); Israel Companies Act §§ 301–305, 307, 309–313 
(establishing mandatory rules to determine when a company is allowed to make a 
distribution to its shareholders, requiring, without exception, that it maintain its 
ability to meet all obligations to creditors).  See also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 11 (1991) (“Equi-
ty investors are paid last, after debt investors, employees, and other investors . . . .  
These equity investors have the “residual” claim in the sense that they get only 
what is left over . . . .”).  But see, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves 
Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corpo-
rate Governance System, 126 YALE L. J. 1870, 1928–29 (2017) (criticizing that under-
standing of the relation between residual and non-residual claims).  However, 
that part of Chief Justice Strine’s article far from negates the concept of residual 
claimancy.  First, it conjures up an image of an “ultimate reckoning of accounts,” 
id. at 1929, on which residuality presumably depends, while overlooking the 
many concrete, continuously binding norms, some mentioned above, that support 
the priority of non-residual creditors.  Second, it points to problems with the en-
forcement of law in this area, not with its substantive content.  Certainly, it is possi-
ble to break the law, for example by transferring wealth to shareholders while ob-
ligations to creditors are not being met.  Yet, no one has a right to do so.  Similarly, 
a breach of contract does not modify the rules of contract law.  Courts and other 
enforcement mechanisms exist in order to prevent and address such violations, in 
corporate law as in any other area. 
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tra-legal, philosophical distinction:  a natural person is an end in 
himself, free to determine his own fate and life purposes.  In con-
trast, a corporation exists to pursue some purpose and goals de-
termined for it by others.  Of course, due to the limits of the corpo-
ration’s physical nature, there is simply no way it could determine 
its own purpose and goals without other people, and the choices 
they make.  This does not undermine the corporation’s existence as 
a separate person; it just means that an artificial person’s life pur-
pose is chosen in a different manner than that of a natural person. 
Moreover, the fixing of purpose, at the corporation’s “birth,” does 
not change the fact that the corporation, through its fiduciaries 
(and usually not its residual claimants), has extremely wide lati-
tude in choosing its course of action, or “way of life,” within that 
purpose.78 
The logical chain laid out above leads to the inevitable exist-
ence of residual claimants, in respect to every corporation.  De-
pending on the type of corporation, residual claimants can have 
many names, such as “partners” or “members.”  In some corpora-
tions, residual claimants are comprised of, and identical to, some 
other group of creditors, as in “mutual insurance companies,” 
where policyholders are also the residual claimants.79  In modern 
corporations, residual claimants are mostly known as “sharehold-
ers”—persons who own a “share.”  Like other securities, a share is 
a “thing,” an object toward which property rights exist; a share has 
owners.  It can also be rented, pledged as collateral, and so on. 
Simultaneously, the share itself is a bundle of rights:80 it confers on 
its owner some obligatory rights, while attaching some obligations 
to at least one other person.  The economic magnitude of these 
rights and obligations is equal to the residual interests of the cor-
78  See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 
1989) (“[Directors’] broad mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corpo-
rate course of action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate profit-
ability.”). 
79  See, e.g., 2017 Annual Report, EQUITABLE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
CANADA 15 (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://cdn.equitable.ca/forms/unsecured/insurance/2017-Annual-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EU4P-4FYA] (showing “policyholders’ equity” as the only 
type of equity in the balance sheet).  Practically, this means that the residual 
claimants have a dual contract with the corporation, giving rise to claims under 
both general (contract and insurance) law and corporate law, including equitable 
claims as discussed in this Article. 
80  See Israel Companies Act § 1 (defining “Share” as “a bundle of rights in 
the company that are determined in law and in the article of incorporation[.]”). 
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poration—those left after all corporate obligations, of any kind, to 
all non-residual claimants are satisfied, in practice or in capacity.81 
Most importantly, the related concepts of “share” and “residu-
ality” create a long, open list of unique problems.  This stems from 
the unusual, not easily explicable nature of residual obligations—
mainly, the inherent lack of any contractual or other legal mecha-
nism to determine what the shareholders’ claim is, except for the 
phrase “what is left after all obligations to other creditors are satis-
fied.”  That phrase might seem straightforward, but it is not. 
Shareholders’ claims are intricately tied to another person’s acts, 
omissions, successes and failures.  They ebb and flow with the cor-
poration’s fortunes.  This situation has no parallels in other legal 
fields.  In contract and property law, for instance, the claimant has 
a claim toward something grounded in external reality, such as 
concepts of money, time and place.  An obligor might breach an 
obligation, but these concepts exist independently of him.  This 
makes it comparatively easy for the claimant to ascertain and de-
mand what is owed, for example, “one hundred dollars.”  In con-
trast, shareholders can never accurately know the extent of their 
claims, both because of information and power asymmetries to 
their detriment, and because many things, some wildly unex-
pected, might happen to the corporation, or within the various re-
lationships arising from the share (shareholder-corporation, share-
holder-shareholder and shareholder-third party).  Therefore, “the 
claim attached to one percent of the corporation’s outstanding 
shares,” or what should be considered as that claim, is far more 
complex and problematic than “one hundred dollars.”82 
81  Residuality characterizes shares by default.  “Regular” residual claim 
shares are often known as “common shares.”  There also exist types of securities, 
sometimes called “preferred shares” (although they can have many other names 
and properties), that carry some contractual terms endowing their owners with 
non-residual, or a combination of residual and non-residual, claims.  Their owners 
may, in fact, be regular creditors.  See infra pp. 280–81 (discussing preferred 
shares).  This situation also occurs in U.S. mutual funds, where shareholders do 
not own a residual claim share; rather, they own trust law claims toward a corpo-
rate trustee and a defined pool, or segment, of its assets.  That definition, often in 
terms of a certain investment strategy, appears in the contractual documents cre-
ating each class of “shares.” 
82  These problems attach to the concept of shares at a very preliminary level. 
For example, the number of outstanding shares is a starting point in any determi-
nation of shareholder rights in a corporation.  It gives meaning to the content of a 
single share, by establishing the relation between it and the entirety of sharehold-
ers’ claims.  However, a shareholder might not even be able to reach that point 
easily enough.  It is possible that shareholders will have no knowledge of the real 
number of outstanding shares a corporation has at a given moment, due to some 
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This unclarity leads to an extraordinary range of possible situa-
tions.  Some of these are between the corporation and its share-
holders:  for example, in the case of no dividend being distributed 
for a long time; no legal right exists to demand distribution.83  Some 
problems are among shareholders themselves, as in the case of a 
dilutive allocation of new shares, which is an indirect transfer of 
wealth from current to new shareholders; general contract law no-
where contemplates this situation.84  Some problems are between 
shareholders and third parties, as in the case of harm done to the 
corporation, and indirectly to shareholders’ claims toward it, 
which for some reason cannot be corrected with legal action taken 
by the corporation itself.85  Another example is harm done to the 
administrative error or an information gap (such as a private allocation of shares 
to a new shareholder, not timely and correctly reported to current shareholders, 
for any reason).  Israeli law partly attempts to address this situation, see Securities 
Regulation (Private Offering of Securities in a Registered Company), 5760-2000, §§ 
2, 21, KT 6051 p. 834 (Isr.) (requiring approval by the stock exchange and a public 
disclosure of the details of any private offering of shares by a public company).  
This provision is meant to prevent information gaps, so that all shareholders 
know of changes in the number of outstanding shares, including those resulting 
from a non-public allocation.  However, this regulation, like any other, can be 
breached, intentionally or not.  This possibility illuminates the crucial difference 
between shares and non-share claims, as the latter are grounded in concepts (such 
as sums of money) independent of the corporation. 
83  Yet, corporate law recognizes and may provide remedy against an inequi-
table withholding of dividends.  See, e.g., Hunter v. Roberts, Throp & Co., 47 N.W. 
131, 134 (Mich. 1890) (“Courts of equity will not interfere in the management of 
the directors unless . . . they . . . refuse to declare a dividend when the corporation 
has a surplus of net profits which it can, without detriment to its business, divide 
among its stockholders, and when a refusal to do so would amount to such an 
abuse of discretion as would constitute a fraud, or breach of that good faith which 
they are bound to exercise towards the stockholders.”), quoted in Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919).  More generally, “the court of equity is 
at all times open to complaining shareholders having a just grievance.”  Id. at 684. 
84  Yet, corporate law recognizes and may provide remedy against inequita-
ble dilution.  See, e.g., Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91 (Del. 2006) (holding that 
former minority shareholders, deprived of value by a debt conversion transaction, 
can bring a direct claim against the former controlling shareholder; also holding 
that in various circumstances, share dilution can give rise to both derivative and 
direct claims); Feldman v. Cutaia, 956 A.2d 644, 655 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“A claim for 
wrongful equity dilution is premised on the notion that the corporation, by issu-
ing additional equity for insufficient consideration, made the complaining stock-
holder’s stake less valuable.”); CA 667/76 L. Glickman Ltd. v. A. M. Barkai Inv. 
Co. Ltd. 32(2) PD 281 (1978) (Isr.), 
https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/LA-2-281-L.htm 
[https://perma.cc/S8FL-P9SK] (affirming grant of injunctive relief to minority 
shareholders, following a large allocation of new shares for consideration below 
their real value). 
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ability of the corporation to distribute rights to its shareholders, as 
with limitations on dividends in the financial sector.86  In some sit-
uations, the third party might be the corporation’s creditors, as in 
the case of an unlawful distribution, or in non-limited liability cor-
porations.  The third party might also be the corporation’s fiduciar-
ies (directly, not derivatively), such as when the corporation is in 
Revlon mode.87  Yet another group of such issues concerns those 
third parties involved in facilitating the corporation-shareholder 
link, such as banks, brokers, custodians, depositories, nominee 
companies, and stock exchanges, without the proper services of 
whom most shareholders would never practically enjoy their 
rights. 
These issues need to be dealt with in a methodic manner, based 
on some unifying, underlying principles, as good law must strive 
to do.  Together, they comprise the field of share law. 
4. THE STARTING POINT:  SIMPLISTIC PERCEPTIONS OF SHARES
Yet, the amount of methodic treatment given to share law, es-
pecially compared to corporate fiduciary law, is surprisingly min-
imal.  One omnipresent problem is under-definition.  In the Dela-
ware General Corporation Law, no definition appears of the terms 
85  Yet, corporate law recognizes the derivative action, brought on behalf of a 
corporation by a shareholder.  See infra note 159. 
86  See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2010), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf [https://perma.cc/99R6-Q968] (estab-
lishing guidelines for implementation by national regulators, regarding, among 
other things, limitations on banks’ and similar financial institutions’ ability to dis-
tribute capital to shareholders).  This exemplifies a situation where the interests of 
the corporation, as well as its fiduciaries, are not aligned with those of sharehold-
ers.  The corporation and its fiduciaries get a “good excuse” to keep and control 
more assets, rather than distribute them.  Hence, they might be more aligned with 
the third party (the regulator) who imposes the limitation.  Conceivably, legisla-
tures and other regulators can mandate any extreme limitation, even barring dis-
tributions altogether.  They might do so in regard to any corporation, not just fi-
nancial services providers.  This illustrates an equity situation, where no “legal” 
right exists (to be entitled to distribution), yet, an outcome where shareholders are 
completely separated from their investment is clearly unjustifiable.  Shareholders 
might be able to challenge this type of regulation.  Their claim would be direct, 
not derivative.  Such a challenge would require (on multiple fronts, from proce-
dural standing to substantive arguments) a well-grounded explanation of shares 
and shareholder rights.  That explanation is provided in share law. 
87  See infra pp. 298–300. 
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“share” or “stock.”  This may be attributed to the lack of an intro-
ductory definitions section in that statute, but it is also the result of 
a deeper issue:  that we think of the concept of a share as some-
thing “taken for granted,” requiring little analysis because we do 
not really need to know what it is.  Supposedly, the share is a black 
box.  We easily and offhandedly identify its “outputs,” such as div-
idends and voting rights, but we have no well-crafted idea of the 
process that generates these particular outputs.  The Delaware 
statute is replete with no less than 662 mentions of the terms 
“shareholder” and “stockholder”,88 granting them a central role in 
many statutory provisions, without ever defining who they are or 
what they possess.  The American Law Institute’s Principles of 
Corporate Governance exemplify this problem even more strongly, 
with an empty definition of an “Equity security” as “a share . . . or 
. . . a security convertible [into a share.]”89  The reader is left not 
knowing what a share, nor an equity security, actually is.  The Isra-
el Companies Act fares slightly better, when it defines a share as “a 
bundle of rights in the company that are determined in law and in 
the article of incorporation[.]”90  This, first, identifies the basic na-
ture of shares:  they are rights (and not, say, contracts).  Second, it 
creates a link between the share and another concept, the constitu-
tional documents, so shares can arise only from that particular con-
tract.  If a security is not mentioned there, it is definitely not a 
share.91  Yet, the statute fails to explain what are rights “in” another 
person (indeed, that phrase is meaningless92), or what prevents a 
corporation from also specifying the details of non-share obliga-
tions in its constitutional documents (indeed, nothing does). 
Another example of this simplistic approach lies in how natu-
rally we view the trading, on the same exchange floor, of shares is-
sued by corporations that are incorporated in very different juris-
dictions, or even legal traditions (civil and common law).  The New 
88  See DGCL (search for the phrases “shareholder” and “stockholder” over 
the entire document). 
89  PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 1.20 (AM. LAW INST. 1994).
90  Israel Companies Act § 1.
91  This is further embodied in the mandatory requirement that the author-
ized capital, which is the maximum number of shares the corporation can issue of 
each class, shall be specified in the article of incorporation.  See Israel Companies 
Act §§ 18(3), 33, 34.  Therefore, if a security is not mentioned, in the article of in-
corporation, as having a certain authorized capital, it is definitely not a share. 
92  See infra Part 5.2. 
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York Stock Exchange lists equity securities issued by corporations 
from China,93 Germany,94 Israel95 and the U.S.,96 among many oth-
ers, and they live unsuspiciously together.  We perceive them just 
as “shares,” rarely stopping to examine their insides.  The corpo-
rate laws of these different places might treat shares in disparate 
ways.  Such differences can be important in multiple respects.  For 
example, only if a corporation has issued shares, not other securi-
ties, to the public, does it become a “public company,”97 with all 
the massive legal ramifications that category entails.  Being a 
“share,” not something else, carries many other consequences, in a 
manner that often takes for granted the ability to differentiate be-
tween shares and non-share obligations.98 
Even when we do try to discern shares from other legal phe-
nomena, a common method is to discuss them in terms of a list of 
rights, or the benefits with which they usually endow their own-
ers.99  That list might include dividends, liquidation proceeds, 
merger proceeds, voting, access to certain information, and per-
haps some court actions.100  However, first, this list is both short 
and not always correct.  It can be contracted around, leaving the 
security owners with more rights or less, or highly modified ones; 
93  See, e.g., Alibaba Group Holding Limited American Depositary Shares Each Rep-
resenting One Ordinary Share (BABA), NYSE, 
https://www.nyse.com/quote/XNYS:BABA [https://perma.cc/6PRH-CGUM] 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2018). 
94 See, e.g., SAP SE ADS (SAP), NYSE, 
https://www.nyse.com/quote/XNYS:SAP [https://perma.cc/M8JQ-JPM9] (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2018). 
95  See, e.g., Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited American Depositary Shares 
(TEVA), NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/quote/XNYS:TEVA 
[https://perma.cc/SZK4-Z872] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018). 
96  See, e.g., International Business Machines Corporation (IBM), NYSE, 
https://www.nyse.com/quote/XNYS:IBM [https://perma.cc/9ZS7-KYXM] (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2018). 
97  See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 1 (defining “Public company” as “a com-
pany whose shares are listed on an exchange or were offered to the public . . . and 
are held by the public[.]”). 
98  See, e.g., supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
99  See, e.g., ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 63, at 146 (introducing shares as 
distinct from debt securities, by focusing on two rights, voting and dividends: 
“Common stockholders elect the board.  After the company has paid its expenses 
. . . and [paid its debts to creditors], whatever is left over can loosely be said to 
“belong” to the stockholders in the sense that it is available for the payment of 
dividends.”). 
100  See, e.g., Israel Companies Act §§ 183–191, 194(a), 320–321; Israel Compa-
nies Ordinance §§ 284, 330(1) (detailing various rights granted to shareholders). 
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they might still be shareholders.  A good example is preferred 
shares.  The term “preferred share” denotes a family of securities 
that straddle the line between actual shares and other securities, 
namely bonds.  A preferred share, despite its name, might not be a 
“share” in any substantive sense.  Even when it is, its content is of-
ten markedly different than that of other securities called “shares;” 
for example, it might not carry any voting rights.  How do we tell if 
something is a share or not?101 How do we determine the legal 
treatment that should be given to a particular security?  These 
questions are part of share law, and its interaction with broader 
concepts of corporate and private law.  General, simplistic views of 
shares do not suffice to explain preferreds, or to fully and fairly de-
termine the rights of their owners—problems that recent scholar-
ship has grappled with.102 
Second, the “list of rights” approach fails to note an important 
fact:  a given corporation might not experience any rights distribu-
tion event (such as a dividend or liquidation) for an extremely long 
time—in fact, a potentially unlimited period—yet, shares of that 
corporation will have intrinsic value and people will buy and sell 
them, for a price, at the secondary market.  This is in contrast to 
other kinds of obligations, which do have a maturity date, or oth-
erwise limited lifetime.  It is clear why bonds have value:  their 
owners have a contractual right to receive known sums of money 
at known times.  Shares carry no such rights; in fact, it is hard to 
ascertain from any textual source (contract or law) what is the eco-
nomic content a share carries throughout its existence.  So, why do 
shares have value?  What is their intrinsic content?  What claims 
does a shareholder have, and toward what or whom? 
101  A question of great practical importance, due to, inter alia, the special sta-
tus that corporate law confers upon shareholders and not others, often by mere 
reference to the word “share” or “shareholder,” presupposing the ability to differ-
entiate between shares and other securities.  See supra note 88 and accompanying 
text (noting that the DGCL mentions the terms “shareholder” and “stockholder” 
662 times, without defining shares). 
102  Compare William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred 
Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815 (2013), with Leo E. Strine, Jr., Response: Poor Pitiful or 
Potently Powerful Preferred?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2025 (2013) (articles presenting dif-
ferent views regarding the nature of preferred shareholders’ rights, on a spectrum 
between equitable rights, similar to those attached to common shares, and con-
tractual rights, similar to those attached to non-share corporate obligations). 
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5. FOUR UNSATISFACTORY APPROACHES TO SHARES
These questions are traditionally answered using several ap-
proaches (that is, beyond the simplistic “black box” and “list of 
rights” approaches outlined above).  As the discussion below re-
veals, even these more developed approaches only examine the 
topic via their own, entrenched perceptions.  Some offer correct ob-
servations, but none is free of inaccuracies; none can serve as the 
basis for a theory and law of shares.  This Part surveys the four 
main approaches invoked today to explain the share phenomenon.  
As a unifying theme, it asks how the Co-Op decision might be justi-
fied, if at all, under each approach. 
5.1.  The Contract Approach 
According to one common approach, shareholders are just a 
group of creditors, who have paid large sums of money103 to enter 
into a contract (the constitutional documents) which in itself is de-
void of meaningful content.  It includes no maturity date, no peri-
odic payments, no financial covenants, and no right to sue under 
general contract law even when the corporation is running badly 
and the chances of getting a return become slim.104  It is a contract 
for a residual claim, with all the attendant problems.105  This ap-
proach views shareholders as contractual parties, but with a large-
ly unwritten,106 custom-based or implied covenant-based con-
103  See supra note 2.  The amounts mentioned there are on a global scale, but 
they are composed of the holdings of many separate shareholders, each the owner 
of substantive rights that should be protected by legal norms and institutions, as 
any other right. 
104  In non-limited liability corporations, shareholders bear an even bigger 
risk: ending up with shares of negative value, due to having to satisfy part or all 
of the corporation’s liabilities themselves.  See supra note 74.  Non-residual credi-
tors do not bear such a risk; if insolvency occurs, they stand to lose, at most, their 
own claim.  This further demonstrates the unique position of shareholders, com-
pared to all other creditors. 
105  See supra Part 3. 
106  See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corpora-
tions: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1989) 
(“Complications arise in corporate transactions, however, because the relevant 
“agreement” is generally unwritten, frequently ambiguous or contradictory and 
often not an agreement at all.”).  See also supra notes 5, 6. 
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tract107 and with legal rights disproportionate to their economic in-
vestment.  They are creditors having none of the protections of 
contract law. 
On the other hand, they might incur the downsides:  in Co-Op, 
one could argue that the unknown shareholders have “aban-
doned” or “slept on” their rights, which under contract law doc-
trine, is possibly sufficient to negate those rights.108 
Furthermore, contract law generally provides a rich, well-
developed doctrinal environment; a good example is the availabil-
ity of remedy against an anticipatory breach of contract.109  Howev-
er, contract law is largely built on the assumption that creditors 
know, or can know (and prove), what they are entitled to.  For 
shareholders, no remedy against “anticipatory breach” is possible, 
because the shareholder has nothing specific enough to anticipate. 
Another important doctrinal problem is that under contract 
law, “the drafting burden [is] on the party asserting the right[.]”110 
Hence, it could have been claimed that the unknown shareholders 
should have had, in Co-Op’s constitutional documents, express 
clauses saying that they hold quasi-property rights, unlimited in 
time, toward the corporation’s net worth; and regulating many 
other situations that might occur, no matter how remote.  Such 
clauses are practically not found in any constitutional documents. 
Similarly lurking are statute of limitations arguments, which can-
not be raised as easily against owners of property or quasi-
property (equity) rights.111 
107  Although the contract approach itself might not necessarily say so, equity 
is the main source of the customs and implied covenants embodied in shares.  See 
infra Part 6. 
108  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-309(1) (2018) (“The time for shipment 
or delivery or any other action under a contract if not provided in this Article or 
agreed upon shall be a reasonable time.”); Contracts Act (General Part), 5733-1973, 
§ 41, SH No. 694 p. 118 (Isr.) [hereinafter: Israel Contracts Act] (“If no time has
been agreed on for the fulfillment of an obligation, it has to be fulfilled a reasona-
ble period after the formation of the contract, at a time of which the creditor has
given notice to the debtor a reasonable period in advance.”).
109  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-610 (2018) (“When either party repudi-
ates the contract with respect to a performance not yet due . . . , the aggrieved par-
ty may . . . resort to any remedy for breach . . . .”); Contracts Act (Remedies for 
Breach of Contract), 5731-1970, § 17, SH No. 610 p. 16 (Isr.) (“If a party indicates its 
intention not to perform a contract, or if it appears from the circumstances that 
[the party] will be unable or unwilling to perform [the contract], the other party is 
entitled to remedies according to this Act even before the date set for the perfor-
mance of the contract . . . .”). 
110  Bratton & Wachter, supra note 102, at 1820. 
111  See, e.g., Peter Watts, Some Aspects of the Intersection of the Law of Agency 
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To a large extent, the contractual approach is associated with 
the school of law and economics and the “nexus of contracts” theo-
ry.  Under these disciplines, a contract is simply a contract; one 
contract may differ from another in terms, but not in general na-
ture.  Hence, shareholders are presumably just another group of 
stakeholders in the corporate nexus.112  It is worth noting that ac-
cording to the nexus of contracts theory, the corporation itself is an 
aggregation of contracts.113  However, that statement is wrong. 
How can “a contract” (or any number thereof) sue someone in 
court, own property, or do anything else?  More correctly, the cor-
poration is a person; it is not the nexus of contracts, but the central 
party to the nexus of contracts.114 
Of the four approaches discussed in this Part of the Article, the 
contract approach, equally with the trust approach,115 is probably 
the least wrong when it comes to shares.  The share relationship is, 
at a basic level, a contractual relationship between shareholder and 
corporation.116  When a person owns a share, that person primarily 
with the Law of Trusts, in EQUITY, TRUSTS AND COMMERCE 29, 45 (Paul S Davies & 
James Penner eds., 2017) (“In many jurisdictions, limitation periods do not apply 
to actions for failure to account brought against an express trustee.”). 
112  See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 15 (1996) 
(“[S]upplying capital to the firm is simply one of many transactional relationships 
to which ownership can be tied, and there is nothing very special about it.”); 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 271, 274 n.8 (1986) (“There is no fundamental difference between 
debt and equity claims from an economic perspective.”).  The answer to this line 
of argument is that, although non-residual creditors might sometimes lose part or 
all of their positive law claim, this does not modify the claim’s intrinsic content, 
which is not residual, is often fixed, is represented by some concepts (such as 
money and time) external to the corporation, and is governed by some normative 
framework external to corporate law.  For creditors, what fluctuates is not their 
claim’s content, but the probability of receiving it.  Creditors’ rights may be negat-
ed when the corporation becomes insolvent, which is the exception; most corpora-
tions are not insolvent.  The content of creditors’ claims can change only accord-
ing to external law, such as contract or bankruptcy law.  The rule, and the general 
perception of being a “creditor,” is that creditors have a relatively stable claim, 
and they usually get it.  In contrast, residual claimants’ positive law claim is in-
trinsically non-fixed and entirely dependent on the corporation.  Their claim is al-
ways fluctuating, even when the corporation is not insolvent, and even if it is very 
successful.  Therefore, shareholders are indeed special and different than non-
residual creditors. 
113  See, e.g., Henry N. Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the 
Market for Corporate Charters, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 365, 369 (1988) (“The corporation is 
a nexus of contracts.”). 
114  See infra Part 5.2. 
115  See infra Part 5.3. 
116  In addition to the other relationships arising from shares: the shareholder-
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owns a claim toward a corporation.  However, by design, that 
claim is exceptionally vague and ill-defined.  It is never put well 
into words—neither in contract, nor in law.  It is far removed from 
the concept of a contract as we normally think of it.  As a result, 
whenever we discuss the contractual approach, we must remember 
that the “share contract” is singularly exceptional, among all the 
corporation’s relationships.  It should never be described in terms 
of contract law alone.  Rather, it is intertwined with another nor-
mative framework—equity.  Part 6 of this Article expands on that 
distinction. 
5.2.  The Property Approach 
At the other end of the spectrum, some have argued that 
shareholders “own” the corporation,117 or are the true owners of 
the corporation’s assets.118  This approach is related to the “aggre-
gate theory” of the corporation, which contends that a corporation 
is just a grouping of other individuals, usually its shareholders.119 
Property rights are eternal; they do not have a maturity date. 
Under this approach, the result in Co-Op may be justified:  proper-
ty rights cannot be taken away, absent some exceptional circum-
stances, even if their owner fails to demand those rights or show 
shareholder and shareholder-third party relationships.  See supra pp. 277–78. 
117  See, e.g., William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Cor-
poration, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264–65 (1992) (“In the first conception, the corpo-
ration is seen as the private property of its stockholder-owners.”); Katsuhito Iwai, 
Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality Controversy and Compara-
tive Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 592 (1999) (“[W]hat does a corpo-
rate shareholder own?  The corporation, of course.  It is the corporation itself as a 
“thing” that a corporate shareholder legally owns.  A corporate shareholder is lit-
erally a holder of a corporate share, a bundle of participatory and pecuniary rights 
in the corporation.”). 
118  See, e.g., VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS OTHER THAN CHARITABLE 2 (1882) (“[T]he rights and duties of an 
incorporated association are in reality the rights and duties of the persons who 
compose it, and not of an imaginary being.”), quoted in Gregory A. Mark, The Per-
sonification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1458 
(1987). 
119  See, e.g., Jennifer Hill, Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder, 48 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 39, 42 (2000) (“The aggregate or partnership model of the corporation, 
which was prevalent in the 19th century, assumed [a role as the “owners” of the 
corporate enterprise] for shareholders . . . .” (citation omitted)).  On the aggregate 
theory, see generally Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation is a Person: The Language of 
a Legal Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV. 563, 566 (1987). 
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up in court to defend them.  Certainly, they can be eliminated 
much less easily than purely obligatory rights. 
However, the property approach is also mistaken.  A corpora-
tion is a person.120  It exists separately from any other person, in-
cluding its shareholders.  Like other persons, a corporation can en-
ter into obligatory relationships and can own property.  A 
corporation is not and cannot be property.  Shareholders do not 
own the corporation; they own shares.121  While it is meaningful to 
discuss the ownership of a right toward a corporation, it is unclear 
what might it mean, in both philosophical and property law terms, 
to “own” a corporation—another person, with interests and voli-
tion of its own.122  Furthermore, the corporation is the full owner of 
its own assets,123 including that portion amounting to its net worth 
120  See, e.g., DGCL § 122 (detailing a list of “powers” held by every Delaware 
corporation, generally similar and often identical to the capacities of a natural per-
son); Israel Companies Act § 4 (“A company is a legal person capable of any right, 
duty and act that is consistent with its character and nature as an incorporated 
body.”); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 453–54 (1882) (“This corporation, like 
others, is created a body politic and corporate . . . .  [It] may make contracts, com-
mit torts, and incur liabilities, and may sue or be sued in [its] corporate name in 
regard to all of these transactions.  The parties who deal with [the corporation] 
understand this, and that they are dealing with a body which has these rights and 
is subject to these obligations, and they do not deal with or count upon a liability 
to the stockholder whom they do not know and with whom they have no privity 
of contract or other relation.”); Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL) 30 
(appeal taken from Eng.) (“[O]nce the company is legally incorporated it must be 
treated like any other independent person with its rights and liabilities appropri-
ate to itself . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“Unless its 
articles of incorporation provide otherwise, every corporation has perpetual dura-
tion and succession in its corporate name and has the same powers as an individ-
ual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and af-
fairs . . . .”); ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 63, at 77 (“The corporation is 
considered a separate person in the eyes of the law.”); John C. Coates IV, State 
Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 806, 818–35 (1989) (discussing in detail the “natural entity theory” of the cor-
poration); Schane, supra note 119, at 592–609 (providing legal and linguistic analy-
sis of the concept of corporate personality). 
121  See, e.g., YEDIDIA Z. STERN, HA’BA’ALUT BA’HEVRAH HA’ISKIT: TE’ORYAH, DIN, 
METSI’UT [THE OWNERSHIP OF A CORPORATION: THEORY, LAW, REALITY] 129 (2008) 
(“Shareholders, as their name also attests, hold a right of ownership in a share and 
not a right of ownership in the company.”). 
122  See id. at 136 (“The company is an entity with interests of its own, that dif-
fer from those of any other actor . . . .  The company is meant to act independently 
of any other entity to promote those interests.”); infra note 145 and accompanying 
text. 
123  See, e.g., DGCL § 122(4) (“[Every corporation created under this chapter 
shall have power to] [p]urchase, receive, take by grant, gift, devise, bequest or 
otherwise, lease, or otherwise acquire, own, hold, improve, employ, use and oth-
erwise deal in and with real or personal property, or any interest therein . . . [.]”); 
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(shareholders’ equity).  Shareholders, as other creditors may do, 
have entered into a contract, not a possessory relationship, with the 
corporation.124  That contract is the constitutional documents, along 
with the legal and equitable norms they necessarily absorb.  In 
summary, a corporation is not property, and its own property be-
longs to it, not to its shareholders.  Therefore, a property approach 
to the nature of shares cannot hold. 
5.3.  The Trust Approach 
The trust approach would turn to trust law, viewing the corpo-
ration125 as a trustee, where shareholders are the beneficiaries and 
the corporation’s net worth is the trust property.  Seemingly exem-
plifying this approach is A. A. Berle’s famous 1931 article.126 
If this approach is correct, the Co-Op decision can be rather eas-
ily explained:  shareholders have a trust claim toward their frac-
tions of the corporation’s net worth; that claim, somewhat similar 
to a property right as discussed above,127 does not have a maturity 
date (unless otherwise specified in the terms of the trust; there was 
no such stipulation in Co-Op’s constitutional documents), so 
shareholders own a right that is unlimited in time. 
Once again, upon closer inspection, both trust law and corpo-
rate law do not support this approach.  First, trust law is conserva-
tive.  It is geared toward different purposes than corporate law.  By 
default, the trustee has to maintain the trust property,128 not engage 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“[Every corporation has 
power] to purchase, receive, lease, or otherwise acquire, and own, hold, improve, 
use, and otherwise deal with, real or personal property, or any legal or equitable 
interest in property . . . [.]”).  The same proposition is implicit in Israel Companies 
Act § 4.  In addition, references to the company’s own property are spread 
throughout that statute, which also never mentions any proprietary link between 
shareholders and the company’s assets. 
124  See supra notes 4, 72. 
125  In a different variation, the corporation’s directors are the trustees or fi-
duciaries for shareholders.  That approach may equally be refuted, see infra Part 
5.4. 
126  See A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 
1049, 1049 (1931) (arguing that “all powers granted to a corporation . . . are . . . ex-
ercisable only for the . . . benefit of . . . shareholders”, and that this is analogous to 
limitations on the power of trustees). 
127  See supra Part 5.2. 
128  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302 (2018) (instructing trustees as to 
“authorized investments”); Trust Act, 5739-1979, § 6, SH No. 941 p. 128 (Isr.) 
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in complex, risky activities, typical of the modern corporation.  A 
chief consideration in trust law is the welfare of the beneficiary.  In 
corporate law, shareholders are important, but their interests are 
not nearly as overriding as those of trust beneficiaries. 
Second, a trust is a narrowly and strictly articulated concept. 
For example, in Israel, it is defined as “a relation to an asset accord-
ing to which a trustee has to hold or act upon it for the benefit of a 
beneficiary or for another goal.”129  The “asset”—some piece of 
property—is a key component of any trust.  Indeed, trust law is 
property-oriented, but the modern corporation is not simply a 
keeper of assets.  It is an active and dynamic person, engaging in a 
host of acts that are often unrelated to safeguarding shareholders’ 
investment.  For example, when SpaceX develops a new type of 
Mars-going rocket,130 besides being a risky use of corporate funds 
(related to the first point above), it is also an activity that has abso-
lutely nothing to do with the work of a trustee.  Abiding by the 
narrow strictures of trust law would not have allowed many mod-
ern corporations to exist, and would hinder the interests of both 
corporations and shareholders.131 
Third, there is little support in positive law to the concept of 
the corporation being a trustee for shareholders.  A survey of the 
corporate statutes of Israel, Delaware, the MBCA, and the U.K. re-
veals that none of them offer such a proposition.  Furthermore, 
courts have repeatedly held that the corporation is not a fiduciary 
for its shareholders.132  Since a trustee is one type of fiduciary,133 it 
[hereinafter: Israel Trust Act] (“Those trust funds that are not required for [the 
trust’s] ongoing needs, the trustee is obliged to hold or invest as is efficient to main-
tain the principal and make returns . . . .” (emphases added)). 
129  Israel Trust Act § 1. 
130  See, e.g., Stephen Clark, Musk: Atmospheric tests of interplanetary spaceship 
could happen next year, SPACEFLIGHT NOW (Mar. 13, 2018), 
https://spaceflightnow.com/2018/03/13/musk-atmospheric-tests-of-
interplanetary-spaceship-could-happen-next-year [https://perma.cc/9LJJ-P7VN].  
Space Exploration Technologies Corp., also known as SpaceX, is a Delaware cor-
poration.  See Division of Corporations - Filing, DELAWARE.GOV, 
https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/ecorp/entitysearch/NameSearch.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/6GKQ-BNT4] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (search for entity 
name “Space Exploration Technologies Corp.” or file number 3500808). 
131  Cf. Kornhauser, supra note 106, at 1450 (“Unlike contract, which allows 
much discrimination in allocating entitlements among parties to the agreement, 
trust does not seem adequately flexible to explain the complex allocation of obli-
gations and privileges among this web of actors.”). 
132  See, e.g., In re Stillwater Capital Partners Inc. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 556, 
573 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“A corporation does not owe a fiduciary duty to its share-
holders . . . .”); Alessi v. Beracha, 849 A.2d 939, 950 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Earthgrains 
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is all the less plausible to see the corporation as shareholders’ trus-
tee. 
Fourth and very pointedly, even when Berle wrote of share-
holders’ rights in trust, he did so by analogy.  The analogy is to eq-
uity.  Berle says so explicitly: 
[I]n every case, corporate action must be twice tested:  first,
by the technical rules having to do with the existence and
proper exercise of the power; second, by equitable rules
somewhat analogous to those which apply in favor of a [trust
beneficiary] to the trustee’s exercise of wide powers grant-
ed to him . . . .134
“Somewhat analogous” is far from “identical.”  In fact, 
throughout Berle’s paper, “equity” and its inflections appear more 
frequently than “trust”:  52 and 38 times, respectively.135  Quite 
plainly, Berle meant to say that shareholders have equitable, or 
more-than-legal, more-than-contractual rights.  The liberty Berle 
took in using “trust” for the title of his article is partly understand-
able, because trust law is a branch of equity.  A right in trust is one, 
very common type of equitable right.  Yet, as the discussion above 
illustrates, trust law is a specific area of jurisprudence, adding its 
own rules and conventions on top of those of general equity.  Eve-
ry corporation is an equitable obligor; not every corporation is a 
trustee.136  The trust approach, like the contract approach, comes 
[(defendant corporation)] owes no fiduciary duty to Alessi [(plaintiff sharehold-
er)].  I will not require Earthgrains to remedy Alessi’s injury without a valid legal 
theory for holding Earthgrains liable.”). 
133 See, e.g., Trust Code Summary, THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 
http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Trust%20Code 
[https://perma.cc/P4MD-J57Y] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (“A trustee is a fiduci-
ary, sometimes described as the utmost fiduciary.”). 
134  Berle, supra note 126, at 1049 (emphasis added). 
135  See id. (search for the phrases “equit” and “trust” over the entire docu-
ment).  Moreover, many uses of the word “trust” in Berle’s article are as part of a 
name, such as “Fidelity Trust Company”, id. at 1064, so the actual balance favors 
“equity” even more. 
136  Of course, a corporation can also become a trustee, usually by entering 
into a trust contract.  Some corporations, such as trust companies and money 
managers, are primarily devoted to such activity.  The trust beneficiary is an equi-
table but non-residual creditor of the corporation.  The beneficiary’s rights are 
grounded in a field of law (trusts) that is external to corporate law, and they relate 
to some asset that is not entirely the product of the corporation’s fortunes.  On the 
distinction between residual claims and those grounded in external reality, see su-
pra p. 276. 
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relatively close to the truth, but still requires qualification.  Even 
when, as this Article urges, we adopt a broad, holistic view to pro-
tect substantive rights, precision is important. 
5.4.  The Fiduciary Approach 
According to another approach, which presumably reflects 
most law in the United States, what shareholders own is a direct 
claim toward the corporation’s fiduciaries.  For example, a com-
mon reading of the famous Dodge v. Ford decision137 implies that 
directors owe their duties not only to the corporation, but also di-
rectly to shareholders.  No other group of creditors enjoys those du-
ties.  This can be taken to mean that shareholders and directors are 
parties to the same relationship, which gives rise to a heightened 
duty toward shareholders, co-existing with directors’ duties to-
ward another person—the corporation.  Some Delaware cases 
seemingly imply the same.138  This position accords with a plural-
istic view of fiduciary law, which allows for the recognition of mul-
tiple, separate types of beneficiaries within the same fiduciary ar-
rangement. 
However, this approach, as well as the assertion that it reflects 
current American law, are both incorrect.  First, even if it did mir-
ror U.S. law, the pluralistic view is globally an exception.  Other ju-
risdictions, including Israel,139 the U.K.,140 and most civil law Euro-
137  Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
138  See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) 
(“[D]irectors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests 
of the corporation and to act in the best interests of its shareholders.”); Cres-
cent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 979 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“Directors 
have an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and 
the stockholders alike.”).  But see infra pp. 298–300 (explaining that the mergers 
and acquisitions context, where the cases mentioned in this footnote arose, is an 
exception partly allowing for direct duties toward shareholders). 
139  See Israel Companies Act §§ 252(a) (“An officer owes toward the company 
a duty of care . . . .”), 254(a) (“An officer owes a duty of loyalty to the compa-
ny . . . .”).  The term “officer” includes a director, see Israel Companies Act § 1. 
140  See Companies Act 2006 § 170(1) (UK) (“The general duties specified in 
sections 171 to 177 are owed by a director of a company to the company.”).  See 
also D. D. Prentice, Directors, Creditors, and Shareholders, in COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF 
TRUSTS AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 73, 73 (Ewan McKendrick ed., 1992) (“It is a 
generally accepted principle of company law that directors owe their duties to the 
company and not to the company’s creditors or to its shareholders . . . .”). 
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pean countries,141 take the monistic view:  directors and similar fi-
duciaries owe their duties only to the corporation.  In turn, the cor-
poration owes various obligations to others—contractual, tort, eq-
uitable, environmental, or any other kind.  Like any person, the 
corporation is required to obey positive law, including share law, 
and meet its obligations.  Yet, this has nothing to do with extend-
ing fiduciaries’ duties, beyond their duty to the corporation.142 
Second, from a normative standpoint, this approach is bad law. 
A core tenet of fiduciary law is that a fiduciary may not be the 
servant of two masters.143  In other words, under fiduciary law, di-
vided loyalty is breached loyalty.144  The interests of the corpora-
tion and its shareholders can and do diverge.145  Therefore, this du-
141  See Klaus J. Hopt, Directors’ Duties to Shareholders, Employees, and Other 
Creditors: A View from the Continent, in COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF TRUSTS AND
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 115, 116 (Ewan McKendrick ed., 1992) (“The general rule 
in most European countries is that directors have direct duties and liabilities only 
to their company.”). 
142  This can be stated in terms of corporate purpose: the for-profit corpora-
tion’s purpose is the lawful pursuit of profit.  See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 11 
(“The purpose of a company is to act according to business considerations to max-
imize its profits . . . .”); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 
(Del. Ch. 2010) (“I cannot accept as valid . . . a corporate policy that . . . seeks not to 
maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation . . . .”).  The 
“lawful” part is not mentioned in these sources, but it is obvious: everyone must 
obey positive law; even if a corporation wanted to have a non-lawful purpose, by 
definition, law cannot give cognizance to such an attempt.  Directors and other 
fiduciaries are duty-bound to promote the achievement of the corporation’s pur-
pose.  As pertains to the corporation’s relationship with shareholders, this relates 
to both the “lawful” (the corporation must obey share law) and the “pursuit of 
profit.”  When fiduciaries cause the corporation to not operate this way, they steer 
the corporation away from its purpose and thus breach their duty to the corpora-
tion. 
143  See, e.g., supra note 68 (citing judicial decisions holding that a fiduciary is 
bound to act single-mindedly for the interests of the beneficiary); EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 77, at 38 (“[A] manager told to serve two masters . . . has been 
freed of both and is answerable to neither.”). 
144  See, e.g., LICHT, supra note 9, at 183 (“[T]he duty of loyalty can sustain only 
one interpretation—the monistic interpretation.  A pluralistic approach and a du-
ty of loyalty are contradictory in the most basic sense—definitionally, in fact—so 
an attempt to interpret and apply the duty according to this approach counters 
[the duty of loyalty’s] principles and values.  Such an attempt amounts to an elim-
ination of the duty of loyalty . . . .”). 
145  The benefit of shareholders is closely related, but not identical, to the ben-
efit of the corporation.  The two may diverge in various situations, including the 
distribution of a dividend or a share buyback, the mergers and acquisitions con-
text, or a decision on voluntary dissolution.  This divergence was also examined 
in a well-known Delaware Court of Chancery opinion.  See Credit Lyonnais Bank 
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (illustrating a situation where a corporation, its sharehold-
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ality is neither desirable nor practicable. 
Third, this approach is structurally flawed.  Even if sharehold-
ers did enjoy direct duties owed by directors, that would not be of 
much help, because directors are not the owners of the corpora-
tion’s assets; the corporation is.  If, for any reason, the corporation 
loses a certain amount of wealth (an indirect loss for shareholders), 
that amount does not necessarily go into directors’ pockets.  This is 
particularly true when the loss results from a breach of the duty of 
care, rather than the duty of loyalty; or when it results from no fi-
duciary breach at all, but from the action of a third party, which di-
rectors could not practically have prevented.  Moreover, the larger 
the amount, the less likely it is that directors (or their insurers) can 
or will fully compensate for it.  In any case, the economic claim 
held by shareholders is toward the corporation and its net worth, 
not its directors and their net worth. 
Fourth, this approach is also flawed from another structural 
perspective.  Shareholders and directors are not parties to the same 
contract.  Each director is party to a contract with the corporation, 
an “employment contract” of sorts, heavily laden with terms of fi-
duciary law (often unwritten and implied).  These contracts are ini-
tially entered into when the corporation is created and its first di-
rectors embark upon their roles.146  They are separate from another 
contract—the corporation’s constitutional documents, also coming 
into force the moment the corporation is formed.147  That contract is 
recognized, either by statute or case law,148 to involve the corpora-
tion and its shareholders as parties.  The one person who is party 
ers and its creditors each have a different interest as to the same business deci-
sion).  This non-identity is further reflected in the difference between various 
“time frames” toward which the corporation may be oriented.  The corporation 
may operate for its long-term benefit, or some other time horizon lawfully deter-
mined by its fiduciaries.  See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 
A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) (“[Directors’] broad mandate includes a conferred au-
thority to set a corporate course of action, including time frame, designed to en-
hance corporate profitability. . . . [A]bsent a limited set of circumstances . . . , a
board of directors . . . is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value 
in the short term . . . .” (citation omitted)).  While this should also benefit share-
holders, as claimants toward the corporation and the residual of its wealth, it does
so in a manner that might be objectionable to some, or even the majority of,
shareholders.  This is far from the pretense that the corporation and its sharehold-
ers are the same, have the same interests, or can be the object of the same duties.
146  See supra note 72. 
147  See, e.g., DGCL § 106; Israel Companies Act § 16 (“A company’s article of 
incorporation . . . is in force from the time of its incorporation.”). 
148  See supra notes 4, 72. 
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to both contracts is the corporation.  This, too, makes plain that 
shareholders’ rights come to them from the corporation. 
Fifth, careful examination reveals that even Dodge v. Ford sup-
ports the monistic view:  directors owe their duties only to the cor-
poration.  Dodge v. Ford never says that shareholders directly bene-
fit from fiduciary duties,149 but only that shareholders are special, 
compared to all other creditors.  That is because “[a] business cor-
poration is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders.  The powers of the directors are to be employed for 
that end.”150  Clearly, the topic Dodge v. Ford entertains is the pur-
pose of the corporation, not the identity of fiduciary law beneficiaries. 
The rights of shareholders are channeled through the corpora-
tion—they are a product of the existence and organization of the 
corporation.  They do not directly flow from directors, whom 
Dodge v. Ford instructs as to carrying on the business of the corpora-
tion. 
Even when not relying on Dodge v. Ford, for example in Dela-
ware,151 the “direct fiduciary” interpretation is misguided.  Given 
the weight of positive and normative evidence against a fiduciary 
approach to shares, as presented in this section, decisions and oth-
er materials to such effect should be read accordingly.  Where “du-
ties to the corporation and its shareholders,” or similar language, is 
employed, its correct construction is “duties to the corporation, 
who in turn owes to shareholders.”  This reading fully conforms 
with existing law, while correcting a certain imprecision, which 
tends to occur for several reasons.  To begin with, shareholders’ 
claim is closely linked to the corporation’s well-being, which direc-
tors are duty-bound to advance.  The more the corporation 
achieves its purpose, usually the greater the benefit of shareholders, 
assuming correct operation of share law.  This close relation, be-
tween the welfare of residual claimants and that of the corporation, 
might easily motivate the inaccurate wording.  Courts write as if 
the two are identical, so there is no “translation” process between 
them, and there is not much difference between saying “the corpo-
ration” and “its shareholders.”  As this Article demonstrates, that 
assumption is untrue.  The relation is not an identity; equating the 
149  In fact, the word “fiduciary” is never mentioned in the decision.  See 
Dodge v. Ford. 
150  Id. at 507 (emphases added). 
151  See supra note 138. 
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two is, at most, a general metaphor.152 
The phrasing inaccuracy might also arise from the fact that 
shareholders’ rights are grounded in equity-based share law, and 
equity is closely related to fiduciary law.  In essence, courts are us-
ing “fiduciary” as code for “equity.”  They are trying to convey 
that shareholders are not regular, arm’s length creditors, but equity 
claimants, with more-than-legal, more-than-contractual rights, jus-
tified by power and information asymmetries, similar to those 
found in fiduciary relationships.  That is entirely accurate; yet, it 
does not turn shareholders into fiduciary law beneficiaries.  Fidu-
ciary law and equity are not synonymous.  Different types of equi-
ty claimants exist.153  This distinction has far-reaching practical im-
plications.  Fiduciary law is strict.  With the duty of loyalty at its 
heart, it requires the fiduciary to self-abnegate and to treat all bene-
ficiaries with the same, extremely high standard of conduct.154 
Loyalty is not a matter of degree.  Equity, the taxonomical parent 
of fiduciary law, operates more broadly:  it can inject flexibility 
where required.  It enables us to fine-tune the concept of share-
holders, recognizing they are separate from the corporation, and 
cannot be the object of the same duties, while also realizing they 
are different from non-residual creditors, and must be protected 
appropriately.  In fact, Delaware law submits to this distinction.  It 
concedes that direct duties, owed by directors to shareholders, are 
an exception, arising only in situations such as those invoking 
Revlon duties.155  Moreover, the Unocal and Revlon standard of re-
152  See, e.g., LICHT, supra note 9, at 199 (“[T]he [duty of loyalty] itself is to-
ward the company.  Shareholders are beneficiaries in a conceptual and indirect 
manner . . . .”); Paul L. Davies, Directors’ Fiduciary Duties and Individual Sharehold-
ers, in COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF TRUSTS AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 83, 83–84 (Ew-
an McKendrick ed., 1992) (discussing “the doctrine that the duties of directors are 
owed to shareholders collectively” in a way that reveals no practical difference 
from duties “to the company”; further mentioning that “directors’ duties . . . in-
volve obligations owed . . . [to a] group not normally limited to the existing share-
holders of the company”, but also including future and “potential sharehold-
ers”—which confirms that the only actual, identifiable person, to whom those 
duties can run, is the company).  See also supra note 145.  A purpose-based formu-
lation of corporate law can easily bridge this conceptual gap, by clarifying that the 
fiduciary’s duty, toward the corporation, is to promote the achievement of the 
corporation’s purpose, which is the lawful pursuit of profit, which in turn (by op-
eration of share law) also benefits shareholders.  See supra note 142. 
153  See infra pp. 303–05. 
154  See supra notes 68, 69, 144; infra pp. 304–05. 
155  See infra pp. 298–300. 
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view is an “intermediate standard”156 of “enhanced scrutiny”,157 
above the business judgment rule, but below the entire fairness re-
quired by the duty of loyalty.158  This is precisely the flexibility af-
forded by equity, and forbidden under fiduciary law.  Delaware 
itself, the seeming focal point of “direct fiduciary” language, in fact 
adopts a nuanced, equitable approach to share law. 
Sixth, another proof that even the American (and specifically 
Delaware) view is monistic, as in other jurisdictions, comes from 
the distinction between derivative and direct actions.  If directors 
owed directly to shareholders, or if the corporation’s “middleman” 
status was otherwise eliminated, there would be no difference be-
tween harm to the corporation and harm to its shareholders.  Every 
lawsuit against directors (or any other defendant, for that matter) 
could then be brought as a direct action, in the name of sharehold-
ers.  In reality, the existence of, and insistence on, derivative ac-
tions demonstrate that only the corporation is the beneficiary of di-
rectors’ duties.  Shareholders may assert a breach of those duties 
only indirectly, on behalf of the corporation.  Practically, this dis-
tinction is extremely consequential, as any plaintiff who tries to 
navigate the unique procedural hurdles of derivative litigation 
quickly learns.159 
156  See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard 
for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 
248 (1989) (“[T]he Delaware courts’ most recent response to the tension between 
the intrinsic fairness standard and the business judgment standard in the takeover 
context [is a]n intermediate standard of review mandating that management’s de-
fensive tactics must be “reasonable in relation to the threat posed” by a hostile of-
fer.” (citation omitted)). 
157  See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
184 (Del. 1986) (discussing “the enhanced scrutiny which Unocal requires of direc-
tor conduct.”); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) 
(“When a board addresses a pending takeover bid . . . there is an enhanced duty 
which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the 
business judgment rule may be conferred.”). 
158  See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 156, at 247 (“[T]he intrinsic fair-
ness test[ does] not seem adequate [(due to over-strictness)] when courts must 
evaluate defensive measures that implicate . . . [management’s] loyalty to share-
holder interests.”).  If management really owed to shareholders a full duty of loy-
alty, the same as it owes to the corporation, then according to fiduciary law prin-
ciples, see supra notes 68, 69, 144, it would be impossible to diverge downwards 
from the entire fairness test.  Clearly, then, that is not what management owes to 
shareholders. 
159  For the rules governing the distinction between direct and derivative ac-
tions, and the pretrial stages of a derivative action in Delaware, see Tooley v. Don-
aldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004) (holding that the 
distinction between derivative and direct claims turns solely on “who suffered the 
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Furthermore, not only shareholders can file derivative lawsuits; 
sometimes, creditors can do so as well.160  In any case, the action is 
brought on behalf of the corporation and for the corporation’s benefit. 
The fundamental idea behind Gheewalla161 is that just like share-
holders, if creditors are to be righted for a wrong they suffered, 
they have to address the corporation; their rights are channeled 
through the corporation; they do not have direct claims toward an-
yone else.  The ultimate, indirect outcomes of fiduciary duties and 
their breach can be complex (such as harm to creditors, rather than 
or in addition to shareholders), but those duties are owed to the 
corporation, who is itself the distributor of wealth (or other legal 
effects) to both shareholders and creditors, and the object of claims 
by them. 
Seventh, contrary to the common yet mistaken reading of 
Dodge v. Ford and the “direct fiduciary” Delaware decisions, multi-
ple other landmark cases and leading authorities, from Delaware 
itself, support the same proposition as this Article:  the corporation 
alleged harm” and “who would receive the benefit of any . . . remedy”); Rales v. 
Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933–34 (Del. 1993) (determining whether to allow a deriv-
ative action to proceed, where the board that would consider the pre-suit demand 
is not the same board that committed the alleged harm); Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 
A.2d 767, 775–76 (Del. 1990) (holding that by sending a demand letter, the plaintiff
concedes that the board’s decision not to pursue the action should be reviewed
under the business judgment rule, thereby practically negating the plaintiff’s de-
rivative claims; thus, establishing a universal non-demand rule, where the adjudi-
cation on the merits of a derivative action is centered on the issue of demand ex-
cusal in the pretrial, motion to dismiss stage); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814
(Del. 1984) (establishing the test to determine whether a demand on the board is
excused prior to filing a derivative action).  See also infra note 244.  In Israel, every
derivative action involves a preliminary certification stage, consisting of a trial in
itself, whereby the court determines if the plaintiff may represent the corporation
and proceed to litigate the main case.  In that preliminary stage, the court is in-
structed to consider, first, whether conducting the lawsuit would be in the benefit 
of the corporation (taken to require a prima facie showing of a cause of action) and,
second, whether the plaintiff acts in good faith.  See Israel Companies Act § 198(a).
Similarly to Delaware, the actual adjudication on the merits usually occurs in the 
preliminary stage.  The main idea is that derivative actions are different, and usu-
ally more complicated to bring and maintain, than direct actions.
160  See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 204 (allowing creditors of a company to 
file a derivative action if it arises from certain causes of action, mainly unlawful 
distribution to shareholders); N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. 
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007) (“[I]ndividual creditors of an insolvent 
corporation have no right to assert direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty 
against corporate directors.  Creditors may nonetheless protect their interest by 
bringing derivative claims on behalf of the insolvent corporation . . . .” (emphases 
omitted)). 
161  930 A.2d 92. 
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is the beneficiary of directors’ duties, while shareholders have a 
claim toward the corporation, derived from its well-being—in any 
case, a claim different than that which the corporation holds to-
ward its fiduciaries.162 
Eighth, to be certain, shareholders also do not normally owe fi-
duciary duties to one another.  This is especially true with “regu-
lar,” non-controlling shareholders, not otherwise acting in fiduci-
ary capacity (for example, the tens of thousands known 
shareholders in Co-Op).163  That is so for a good reason:  contrary to 
a fiduciary position, share ownership carries far more rights than 
duties.  This conforms with the generally held perception of shares, 
arising mainly from the fact that shareholders pay for their shares 
and correctly expect to become “creditors” or claimants, not the 
opposite (debtors or obligors).  Even those shareholders who are 
fiduciaries owe their duties to the corporation.164  What all share-
162  See, e.g., Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101 (“It is well settled that directors owe 
fiduciary duties to the corporation.  When a corporation is solvent, those duties may 
be enforced by its shareholders, who have standing to bring derivative actions on 
behalf of the corporation because they are the ultimate beneficiaries of the corpora-
tion’s growth and increased value.” (first and last emphases added) (citation omit-
ted)); Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (distinguishing shareholders from the corpo-
ration, in the context of discerning direct claims from derivative claims); 
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) (“[Direc-
tors’] broad mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of 
action . . . designed to enhance corporate profitability. . . . [D]irectors, generally, 
are obliged to charter a course for a corporation which is in its best interest[.] . . . 
[A]bsent a limited set of circumstances as defined under Revlon, a board of direc-
tors . . . is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short
term . . . .” (citation omitted)); Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The
Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L. J. 629, 636 (2010) (“[T]he 
director’s job demands affirmative action—to protect and to better the position of
the corporation. . . . [E]very act must be taken for a proper corporate purpose[.] . . .
[A] loyal fiduciary must protect the corporation . . . .” (emphases added) (citation
omitted)).
163  See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 192(a) (stating that all shareholders must 
act “in good faith”, which is merely a recitation of the general normative standard 
applied to every act in private law, by any person, at any time—that is, a non-
equitable, non-fiduciary standard, not specific to shareholders.  This standard 
originates from Israel Contracts Act §§ 12, 39, 61(b)); infra note 165. 
164  See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 193 (specifying three types of sharehold-
ers, mainly a “controlling shareholder” and a shareholder having decisive power 
in a shareholder meeting, who owe a duty of fairness to the company); Pepper v. 
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (“A director is a fiduciary. . . . So is a dominant or 
controlling stockholder or group of stockholders. . . . Their dealings with the cor-
poration are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or en-
gagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director or 
stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its 
inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested there-
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holders do owe to one another is some set of equitable duties.165 
Consistent with a recurring theme of this Article, those duties are 
equitable, but not fiduciary; they are part of share law, not fiduci-
ary law.  The important difference between the fiduciary-
beneficiary and shareholder-shareholder relationships has also 
been pointed out in scholarship.166 
Ninth, while there are certain situations where directors can be 
said to have a direct duty toward shareholders, they are the excep-
tion, not the rule.  These situations, in the U.S. generally known as 
“Revlon mode,” arise mainly in the mergers and acquisitions con-
text, when a corporation is nearing the end of life in its current 
form—a “breakup” or a “sale of control”, in the language of the 
Paramount decisions.167  This is an equitable construct, acknowledg-
                                                   
in.” (citations omitted).  Regarding the quote’s final words, see supra pp. 293–95 
(explaining that where “duties to the corporation and its shareholders,” or similar 
language, is employed, its correct construction is according to the monistic view)); 
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105, at *63 (Del. Ch. June 
21, 1991) (“[W]hen a shareholder, who achieves power through the ownership of 
stock, exercises that power by directing the actions of the corporation, he assumes 
the duties of care and loyalty of a director of the corporation.”). 
165  See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 192(b) (“A shareholder shall not act with 
unfair prejudice toward other shareholders.”).  In Israel, this is the only statutory 
duty that applies to all shareholders (besides the non-shareholder-specific good 
faith duty, see supra note 163).  The law of unfair prejudice is not part of fiduciary 
law.  See, e.g., LICHT, supra note 9, at 211 (“[T]he law of unfair prejudice is not 
based on fiduciary relations supported by duties of loyalty.”). 
166  See, e.g., Tan Cheng-Han & Wee Meng-Seng, Equity, Shareholders and Com-
pany Law, in EQUITY, TRUSTS AND COMMERCE 1, 9–10 (Paul S Davies & James Penner 
eds., 2017) (“[I]f the stated basis is that shareholder power must be exercised not 
for the benefit of the shareholder but for others, this is not the correct principle 
that operates in a shareholder dispute . . . .  This is because there is a fundamental 
difference in the relationship between partners inter se and between partners and 
the partnership (which is fiduciary), and between shareholders inter se or be-
tween shareholders and the company (which is not).  Accordingly, . . . the test of a 
power that must be exercised for the benefit of another is not an appropriate test 
where shareholders are concerned.”). 
167  See Paramount v. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 (“[A]bsent a limited set of circum-
stances as defined under Revlon, a board of directors . . . is not under any per se 
duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term[.] . . . [T]here are, generally 
speaking . . . , two circumstances which may implicate Revlon duties.  The first . . . 
is when a corporation initiates [a transaction] involving a clear break-up of the 
company. . . . [The second is when] a target abandons its long-term strategy and 
seeks an alternative transaction also involving the breakup of the company. . . . If, 
however, the board’s reaction . . . is . . . not an abandonment of the corporation’s 
continued existence, Revlon duties are not triggered . . . .” (citations omitted)); Par-
amount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47–48 (Del. 1994) 
(“There are few events that have a more significant impact on the stockholders 
than a sale of control or a corporate break-up.  Each event represents a fundamen-
tal (and perhaps irrevocable) change in the nature of the corporate enterprise from 
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ing that when directors make decisions affecting shareholders’ 
own legal and financial positions, in a manner not channeled 
through the corporation, the person standing to gain or lose from 
directors’ actions is not the corporation, but shareholders.  This 
“channeling principle” might apply in situations outside strict 
Revlon mode;168 at any rate, these are exceptions.  We then extend 
the usual scope of director obligations, importing fiduciary du-
ties169 into the ad hoc director-shareholder relationship.  As if to 
emphasize that this is the exception, some of the important author-
ities discussing the rule—duties toward the corporation—do so in 
the mergers and acquisitions context.170  Outside such situations, 
a practical standpoint.  It is the significance of each of these events that justifies . . . 
focusing on the directors’ obligation to seek the best value reasonably available to 
the stockholders . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
168  Such situations include those where the corporation’s interests have be-
come extremely minimized, as in Revlon itself, or where the corporation’s interests 
are simply not being affected.  Consider, for example, an interference with share-
holders’ voting rights, see Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 
(Del. Ch. 1988) (requiring “compelling justification” for “board acts done for the 
primary purpose of impeding the exercise of stockholder voting power”, while 
discussing fiduciary duties owed by directors to shareholders).  In these unique 
situations, the effect on shareholders is unrelated to what the corporation does, or 
what happens to it.  The corporation does not vote in its shareholder meeting; 
shareholders do.  The remedy goes to the shareholders, not the corporation.  Gen-
erally, fiduciaries might commit actions that affect shareholders’ standing in rela-
tion to the corporation—in other words, the very content of their rights under 
share law.  Shareholders should be appropriately protected even where fiduciar-
ies’ usual duties, to the corporation, are not at issue. 
169  But see supra notes 154–158 and accompanying text (explaining that be-
cause Unocal and Revlon give rise to an “intermediate standard”, lower than entire 
fairness, it is not the uniformly high standard imposed by the duty of loyalty). 
170  See, e.g., Paramount v. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 (“Delaware law imposes on a 
board of directors the duty to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. 
. . . This broad mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of 
action . . . designed to enhance corporate profitability. . . . [D]irectors, generally, are 
obliged to charter a course for a corporation which is in its best interest . . . .” (em-
phases added) (citation omitted)); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (“[Once the company was for sale,] [t]he 
duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate 
entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ 
benefit. . . . The directors’ role [before the change was] defenders of the corporate 
bastion . . . .” (emphases added)); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 
946, 954–58 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he board’s power to act derives from its fundamental 
duty and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, which includes stockhold-
ers[.] . . . [T]he board had a supervening duty to protect the corporate enterprise, 
which includes the other shareholders, from threatened harm.” (emphases add-
ed)); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 802 (Del. Ch. 
1988) (“[T]he duties the board always bears [are]: to act . . . in the good faith pur-
suit of corporate interests and only for that purpose.” (emphases added)). 
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particularly during the “going concern” phase of corporate exist-
ence, directors owe their duties to the corporation,171 and share-
holders’ rights come to them from the corporation.  In any event, 
figuring out what directors owe shareholders (in monetary or other 
terms) necessitates an inquiry of share law.  It requires answers to 
questions such as “why do shares have value?” and “which rules 
and principles apply in this share-related situation?”, all relying on 
a satisfactory theory and law of shares. 
Under the fiduciary approach, the holding in Co-Op is not only 
unjustifiable, it is impossible.  That is because in Co-Op, there was 
no breach of fiduciary duty by anyone.  The liquidator performed 
his job diligently, trying to locate as many shareholders as possible. 
Other fiduciaries, such as the corporation’s administrative person-
nel through the years, also cannot be held responsible:  the failure 
to keep an updated shareholder register is the corporation’s own act, 
not any fiduciary’s.  As a rule, corporations bear their own rights 
and duties; it is the corporation who had a duty to correctly main-
tain this register.172  There is also no reason to assume this was 
some fiduciary’s personally interested act, since none would have 
gained any benefit from one group of shareholders, rather than an-
other, receiving the funds.  Even if the corporation’s fiduciaries 
somehow did wrong, the third point of discussion in this section 
applies:173 these people would likely not have US$15 million, or 
anything close to that, just lying around; nor are most of them alive 
today; nor would damages of such scope be an appropriate sanc-
tion for a relatively small omission (at the time it was made); nor 
could the fiduciaries (or their heirs) be required to pay such 
amounts to the unknown shareholders, when the obvious solution, 
which fits the parties’ pre-liquidation expectations, is the one 
reached by the Court:  just keeping the corporation’s money undis-
tributed, allowing the unknown shareholders to claim it when they 
do.  All along, the shareholders’ claim was toward funds in the 
corporation’s, not any fiduciary’s, pocket.  Clearly, Co-Op is a cor-
171  See, e.g., ROTMAN, supra note 66, at 512 (“By analogy with the application 
of Revlon duties, it would seem logical that so long as the corporation remains vi-
able as a going concern, directors and officers retain fiduciary duties to act in the 
corporation’s best interests.”). 
172  See Israel Companies Act § 127 (“A company shall administer a share-
holder register.”), § 130(a) (“In the shareholder register [the following] shall be 
registered[:] . . . The name, identification number and address of each shareholder, 
all as submitted to the company[.] . . .”). 
173  See supra p. 292. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/6
2018] Share Law 301 
porate law case, but not a fiduciary law case.  It is a case in share 
law. 
5.5.  Summary of the Four Approaches 
As we now see, in reality, none of the approaches surveyed 
above is the law.  Indeed, like many174 other creditors, shareholders 
are parties to a contract with the corporation.  It is perfectly correct 
to say that shareholders are “creditors”—as long as we keep in 
mind that they are a singularly unique type of creditors.  Their con-
tract is inherently coupled with extra-contractual, equitable norms. 
Without this qualification, and the special treatment stemming 
from it, the shareholders’ contract would be practically meaning-
less, and certainly not align with the parties’ actual expectations 
and the generally accepted perception of shares. 
It is also true that shareholders have some sort of claim related 
to the corporation’s net worth, but that claim is not a property 
right, nor is it identical to a trust beneficiary’s claim toward a trus-
tee or trust property. 
Finally, it is correct that shareholders have rights different than 
those of all other creditors, but they do not have direct claims to-
ward directors or other fiduciaries.  Rather, the corporation itself, 
who is the beneficiary of its fiduciaries’ duties, is the vessel 
through which shareholders’ rights flow. 
In summary, the rights, or even the existence, of shares and 
shareholders cannot be adequately explained by contract, property, 
trust or fiduciary law.  This should hardly serve to weaken or ob-
scure them:  “Doctrinal formalism has been no match for human 
nature’s inclination towards fairness and justice.”175  So, where do 
they come from? 
174  Many, but not all, creditors have a contract with the corporation.  For ex-
ample, tort law injured parties are involuntary creditors, having no such contract.  
They may be grouped together with non-residual contract creditors in that the 
rights of both arise primarily in law, not equity. 
175  LARRY A. DIMATTEO, EQUITABLE LAW OF CONTRACTS 150 (2001). 
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6. EQUITY AS THE FOUNDATION OF SHARE LAW
Equity is the field of jurisprudence meant to promote justice 
and fairness in situations where regular “law” is unfit or insuffi-
cient for that purpose.176  As this Article demonstrates, that is pre-
cisely what happens with shares:  first, shares have characteristics, 
such as textual (contractual and legal) ambiguity and the phenom-
enon of residuality, which make them impossible to comprehend 
in familiar legal terms.  Second, all the seemingly applicable areas 
of law (contract, property, trust and fiduciary law) are maladjusted 
to treat shares.  Trust and fiduciary law are branches of equity. 
Yet, equity is a field in its own.  Other branches of it may also exist. 
As it turns out, an important branch of equity is share law. 
There are many angles from which to explore the link between 
shares and equity.  This Part of the Article turns to the following: 
residuality, the equity contract, and historical and linguistic con-
nections. 
176  This idea is inherent to equity, both conceptually and historically.  See, 
e.g., Anton-Hermann Chroust, Aristotle’s Conception of Equity (Epieikeia), 18 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 119 (1942) (explaining Aristotle’s view of equity as a supplement to
law, whenever the latter has to be rectified for achieving justice); F. W. MAITLAND,
EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 3–6 (1909) (describing the rise 
of equity as a response to inadequacies in the administration of law, especially
what we today call power and information asymmetries: “Though these great
courts of law have been established there is still a reserve of justice in the king.
Those who can not [sic] get relief elsewhere present their petitions to the king and 
his council praying for some remedy. . . . Very often the petitioner . . . complains
that for some reason or another he can not [sic] get a remedy in the ordinary
course of justice and yet he is entitled to a remedy.  He is poor . . . , his adversary
is rich and powerful . . . , or has by some trick or some accident acquired an ad-
vantage of which the ordinary courts with their formal procedure will not deprive
him. . . . The complaints that come before [the Chancellors] are in general com-
plaints . . . which [the ordinary courts] ought to redress.  But then owing to one
thing and another such wrongs are not always redressed by courts of law.”).  The
analogy, between Maitland’s plaintiff and the modern shareholder (if not for the 
protections of equity), is apparent.  For some of Maitland’s insights on the devel-
opment of corporate law and shares, see F. W. Maitland, Trust and Corporation, in
STATE, TRUST AND CORPORATION 75 (David Runciman & Magnus Ryan eds., 2003)
[hereinafter: Maitland, Trust and Corporation] (chronicling the origins of trusts and
the rise of corporations).  See also Joshua Getzler, Frederic William Maitland - Trust
and Corporation, 35 U. QUEENSLAND L. J. 171 (2016) (exploring the background and 
key thesis of Maitland’s work).
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6.1.  Equity and Residuality:  Two Links 
The concepts of “equity” and “residuality” are related in two 
ways.  First, equity is a normative framework needed in a situation 
where a claimant’s rights are residual, wholly dependent on anoth-
er person.  That is because, similarly to other equitable relation-
ships, the claimant is severely disadvantaged in power and infor-
mation, compared to his obligor (in this case, mainly the 
corporation).  The second link between “equity” and “residuality” 
lies in the fact that equity is a residual normative framework—
simply, it is the one left over after all others fail to accommodate a 
given situation. 
First, a shareholder, while not a trust177 or fiduciary law benefi-
ciary,178 is situated in a very similar position to these types of actors. 
Members of all three groups may be termed “equity claimants.”  
That is because, like the other two, a shareholder is not a regular 
contractual party.  A shareholder is inherently disadvantaged vis-à-
vis his obligor—in this case, mainly the corporation.179  This inferi-
ority is in terms of both power (the ability to affect one’s legal posi-
tion) and information (the ability to know what that position is). 
This results from the unique phenomena explicated above:180 first, 
the share contract (constitutional documents) is exceptionally un-
detailed, compared to other contracts regularly entered into in pri-
vate law.  Second, the shareholder’s claim relates to the ever-
fluctuating residual, or difference between the corporation’s assets 
and liabilities, so it is not grounded in any fact of external reality; 
the shareholder’s claim is entirely dependent on the corporation. 
As with any person, the corporation’s fate can result from its own 
deeds, or from acts done to it by others.  In any case, shareholders 
can hardly do anything to control these actions.  They have some 
governance power, but it is practically limited to appointing other 
people and hoping they, and the corporation, do the right thing. 
Shareholders must accept what the corporation hands them, good 
or bad, with little recourse to any legal claim.  Yet, that is not what 
177  See supra Part 5.3. 
178  See supra Part 5.4. 
179  In addition to the other relationships that arise from shares: the share-
holder-shareholder and shareholder-third party relationships.  See supra pp. 277–
78. In each of these, as well, a shareholder might stand in a position of power or
information asymmetry to one or more of the other parties.
180  See supra Part 3. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
304 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 40:1 
the parties opt for:  the corporation ought to try and succeed, with 
an understanding that this will also protect and grow shareholders’ 
investment.  Shareholders give their money to the corporation, 
who now owns it; yet, there is a sense that shareholders continue 
to own an interest in it, somehow different than that of a “regular” 
creditor.  A mismatch exists between the parties’ rights and the le-
gal tools available to address them.  Therefore, justice and simple 
reason require that the share relationship not be seen as a regular, 
arm’s length relationship under “law” only, but rather, as one that 
invokes the protections of equity. 
The substantive content of shareholders’ equitable claim is sim-
ilar, albeit different, than that of other equity claimants.  For in-
stance, under trust, fiduciary, and share law, the claimant enjoys a 
quasi-proprietary right toward property owned, held, or managed 
by another person.  This is not a full proprietary right under prop-
erty law; it is also not a mere obligatory right under contract law. 
It is something in-between, and the questions pertaining to it are 
answered in the field of equity. 
The major difference between the various equity claims is that 
trust and fiduciary law impose the duty of loyalty, but share law 
does not.  That duty requires total self-abnegation by the trustee or 
other fiduciary,181 while a corporation can, and in many respects 
must, operate for its own benefit.182  Another illustration of non-
fiduciary equity lies in the operation of courts:  standards of review 
for actions affecting shareholders per se and the corporation are dif-
ferent.183 
Shareholders’ lack of fiduciary claims can become very conse-
quential:  take, for example, a shareholder facing bankruptcy, 
which would be avoided only if the shareholder received a divi-
dend from the corporation.  If the corporation, or even its directors, 
were fiduciaries for the shareholder, they would have to pay the 
dividend, consistent with fiduciary principles of self-abnegation 
and acting only in the beneficiary’s interest.184  However, such duty 
181  See supra notes 68, 69. 
182  See supra notes 142, 145. 
183  See supra notes 154–158 and accompanying text (explaining that although 
direct duties toward shareholders are often referred to as “fiduciary” duties, they 
may give rise to less stringent, “intermediate” standards, inconsistent with fiduci-
ary law principles). 
184  One might respond that the “fiduciary” (whether the corporation or its 
directors) presumably owes duties not to any specific shareholder, but to share-
holders “collectively” or to a “fictional shareholder.”  See, e.g., Davies, supra note 
152; Caleb N. Griffin, The Hidden Cost of M&A, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 70, 80 n.24 
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clearly does not exist in positive law, or normatively:  the corpora-
tion is meant to pursue its own benefit and its own plans (which a 
large dividend might upset); corporate decisions, including those 
on dividends, must accord with the corporation’s interests. 
Of course, that the corporation is not shareholders’ fiduciary 
does not mean it can do whatever it wishes, even if that harms 
shareholders, or otherwise violates the terms of the relationship. 
The strong link, between the corporation’s well-being and that of 
its shareholders,185 is guarded by equity.  The translation of the 
former into the latter is achieved through the workings of share 
law, many of which are discussed in Part 7 of this Article. 
Second, equity may be viewed as a residual normative framework, 
designed to provide conceptual and doctrinal infrastructure for 
dealing with situations where other fields of jurisprudence are in-
sufficient, irrelevant, or would lead to incorrect results.  As this Ar-
ticle demonstrates, the origin and nature of shares, and the rights 
of shareholders, cannot be explained through “law”—contract and 
property law.186  Even two branches of equity—trust and fiduciary 
law—have specific characteristics that similarly preclude them 
from serving that purpose:  trust law is built on narrow definitions 
and does not correspond to the nature of the modern corpora-
tion;187 corporate fiduciary law is indeed an important part of cor-
porate law, but it pertains to a separate relationship, that involving 
directors and other fiduciaries, to which the corporation is party, 
but shareholders are not.188  The corporation itself also is not 
(2018) (citing sources that discuss the “fictional shareholder”).  However, such a 
statement is meaningless in terms of fiduciary law, which deals with very strict 
obligations to actual persons.  Practically, duties to a “fictional shareholder” are 
indistinguishable from duties to the corporation (an actual, identifiable person). 
There is no reason, then, to misapply the unique norms of fiduciary law, by misi-
dentifying the parties to the various relationships.  “Fictional shareholders,” 
“shareholders as a whole” and similar phrases simply place us back in the frame-
work of share law, as discussed in this Article. 
185  Most of the time, that link appears obvious: a gain for the corporation is 
an indirect gain for shareholders.  Practically, they may realize it through such 
events as the distribution of a dividend, or selling their shares in the secondary 
market.  In any case, these are channeled through share law: shareholders cannot 
reach any of the corporation’s assets or interests, except through their shares and 
the legal framework governing them.  Furthermore, it is possible for the corpora-
tion’s interests to diverge from those of its shareholders.  See supra notes 86, 145. 
186  See supra Parts 5.1, 5.2. 
187  See supra Part 5.3. 
188  See supra Part 5.4. 
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shareholders’ fiduciary.189  Shareholders have claims similar to 
those found in fiduciary law (in that both are more-than-
contractual, non-arm’s length), but uniquely, no one owes them a 
duty of loyalty.  Yet, they invest fortunes, in money or effort, to ac-
quire their shares.190  Due to this and related reasons (such as de-
fending legitimate expectations and encouraging further invest-
ment), they undoubtedly have rights, deserving of protection.  We 
face a situation where four different, well-developed areas of law 
cannot serve as the foundation of those rights.  What is left is equi-
ty itself, or more specifically, equity-based share law. 
The Co-Op decision illustrates both of these links between equi-
ty and residuality.  First, the Court treats shareholders’ claim to-
ward the rights arising from their shares as having some quasi-
proprietary traits.  This is exemplified by the Court not mentioning 
any statute of limitations or similar issue, which is consistent with 
the rights of an equity claimant, rather than a purely contractual 
party.191  Of course, this is also demonstrated by the final result in 
the case:  the Court treats the unknown shareholders’ rights as 
quasi-proprietary, first, when it defends their claims’ continued ex-
istence (rather than distributing the money to the known share-
holders), and second, when it orders the creation of a trust for an 
unlimited period, where the unknown shareholders’ funds will be 
held.  Since proprietary rights, unlike obligatory (contractual) ones, 
are generally unlimited in time (they do not have a “maturity 
date”), this conforms with a quasi-property, or equity, approach. 
From another typical perspective, the Court recognizes that the 
unknown shareholders are a weak, disadvantaged party.  Despite 
possessing a considerable financial claim, they do not even know 
about it.  The unknown shareholders are completely unable to de-
fend their interests.  The power and information asymmetries here 
are apparent.  They are even more extensive than in most equity 
cases.  These shareholders truly need the protection of equity, and 
the Court does not turn its back on them:  it acts as a court of equi-
ty.192 
Second, Co-Op also exemplifies how equity serves as a residual 
189  See supra Part 5.3, specifically supra note 132. 
190  See supra notes 2, 103. 
191  See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
192  Cf. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“[T]he court 
of equity is at all times open to complaining shareholders having a just griev-
ance.”). 
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normative framework.  That is because the Court’s decision simply 
cannot be explained any other way.  As the opinion shows,193 the 
Court never finds it necessary to delve into substantive contractual, 
property, trust, or fiduciary law analysis.  Even if it tried, Part 5 
above illustrates how these approaches are simply incorrect, or 
(especially the fiduciary approach) completely irrelevant to the 
facts of the case.  Furthermore, despite the Court browsing through 
many of those, no statutory—that is, “law”—provisions actually 
establish the outcome.  Effectively, the Court takes the equity ap-
proach for granted.  The treatment of shareholders as equity claim-
ants operates behind the scenes of the decision:  what the Court is 
essentially doing, throughout the lengthy opinion, is trying to find 
some legal exception to the equitable rule of shareholders’ more-
than-contractual, quasi-property rights.  When the Court finds no 
such exception, it does what it perceives as obvious, and orders the 
conservation of the funds for the unknown shareholders’ benefit. 
6.2.  Shares as Equitable Rights of Contractual Origin 
Another way to explain the link between shares and equity, 
briefly discussed above,194 employs a fairly straightforward idea: 
shareholders have equitable rights, bundled into shares, because 
the corporation and its shareholders have entered into a contract 
that calls for such rights.  In other words, corporate constitutional 
documents are a contract that also gives rise to an equitable rela-
tionship.  This statement is nothing far-reaching:  a trust contract195 
with a trustee196 operates the same way.197  The contract-equity du-
ality naturally extends into corporate law, as the Delaware Court of 
193  See supra pp. 266–69. 
194  See supra pp. 284–85. 
195  Also often called a “deed of trust” or “trust instrument.” 
196  See, e.g., Israel Trust Act § 2 (“A trust is created according to law [or] ac-
cording to a contract with a trustee . . . .”). 
197  The argument here is not that an equitable relationship is purely or main-
ly contractual (and can be contracted around), as has been claimed in regard to 
fiduciary relationships, see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract 
and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. & ECON. 425 (1993).  Rather, the argument is that more-
than-contractual obligations can be imposed with the aid of a contract.  People can 
agree to be bound by certain legal norms, including the norms of equity.  In other 
words, the parties can create a stone that the contract cannot lift.  More accurately, 
they invoke a pre-existing stone: equity. 
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Chancery had vigorously emphasized.198 
In effect, the parties voluntarily summon the norms of equity to 
be part of their relationship.  They do so not in explicit writing—it 
would be unusual to find constitutional documents that state “the 
norms of equity are part of this document for all intents and pur-
poses”—but, in accordance with contract law rules of construction, 
through intent and implied covenants.  The parties, necessarily un-
aware of the extremely wide range of eventualities that might oc-
cur (as Co-Op vividly illustrates), absorb equity into their agree-
ment, because that is the only way to deal with this lack of ability 
to look into the future.199 
The injection of equitable norms into the shareholders’ contract, 
and not into others (such as bonds), is justified because a residual 
claim contract simply cannot ever be detailed enough to protect 
shareholders from the possibilities that uniquely attach to their 
claim.200  Even if it could, constitutional documents are just not 
very detailed in practice, due to the parties’ natural efficiency mo-
tives, pushing them to comply with legal dictates and not much 
more.201  Unlike shareholders, bondholders have a claim to a cer-
tain (or contractually determinable) amount of money, at a certain 
(or contractually determinable) date.  That claim is grounded in 
facts of reality—concepts of money and time—that lie outside the 
corporation.202  If a bond contract is breached, bondholders will 
promptly know that and will likely seek remedy, emanating either 
from the bond itself or from external legal default rules.203  Similar-
198  See, e.g., Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 664 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“An essen-
tial aspect of our form of corporate law is the balance between law (in the form of 
statute and contract, including the contracts governing the internal affairs of cor-
porations, such as charters and bylaws) and equity . . . .  Stockholders can entrust 
directors with broad legal authority precisely because they know that that author-
ity must be exercised consistently with equitable principles . . . .” (citing Berle, su-
pra note 126; Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971))). 
199  See, e.g., Tan & Wee, supra note 166, at 12 (“The common thread . . . is that 
reasonable shareholders would not generally contemplate the occurrence of such 
circumstances within companies of which they are members (even though there 
was no express discussion or agreement between them on such matters) and equi-
ty will therefore not allow the exercise of strict legal rights to maintain this uncon-
templated status quo.”). 
200  See supra Part 3. 
201  See supra notes 5, 6. 
202  On the distinction between residual claims and those grounded in exter-
nal reality, see supra p. 276. 
203  See, e.g., LICHT, supra note 9, at 232 (“In the [arm’s length] relationship [be-
tween debtor and creditor], the person who suffers a breach is basically aware of 
his interests, and when a breach occurs he knows about it—that his property or 
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ly extensive laws also protect other creditors, such as employees. 
In the share context, however, neither the contract itself nor legal 
default rules are designed to answer all questions that can possibly 
arise, or even those that frequently do arise.  Shareholders must 
have equity in their contracts because otherwise asserting a 
“breach” would almost never succeed.  On purely legal-contractual 
grounds, it is impossible to prove that a dividend “should” be dis-
tributed,204 or that shares have been allocated to new owners for 
“too low” a price,205 or that shareholders, as in Co-Op, have “quasi-
property” rights, unlimited in time.  Equity is well-versed in pre-
cisely these kinds of inconvenient arguments. 
As this Article shows, the majority of share-related concepts 
and norms are simply not written anywhere; they seem to be taken 
“for granted.”  It is as if the parties are somehow told:  “you do not 
have to think of this in advance; when questions arise, people just 
know what to do.”  Of course, people would not know what to do, 
if not for equity, designed to provide answers that cannot be found 
elsewhere.  As a result, like every director employment contract206 
implicitly absorbs the norms of corporate fiduciary law, every cor-
poration’s constitutional documents implicitly absorb the norms of 
equity-based share law.207 
The outcome reached by the Court in Co-Op precisely squares 
with the above.  Every time a Co-Op shareholder assumed this po-
sition, the corporation and the shareholder agreed to a contract. 
That contract is the corporation’s constitutional documents, and 
these contain equitable norms.  It is implicitly perceived by the par-
ties that shareholders have an equitable claim, which, as Co-Op 
demonstrates, makes it a quasi-property claim.  Accordingly, it is 
unlimited in time, and is “stronger” than a mere contractual claim 
in other respects as well.208  Indeed, discussing “quasi”-property 
rights, which straddle the line between several legal disciplines, is 
body were damaged or that his contract was not fulfilled.”). 
204  See supra note 83. 
205  See supra note 84. 
206  That is the contractual arrangement, unwritten in part, that governs the 
relationship between a director and the corporation.  See supra note 72; supra pp. 
292–93. 
207  Cf. Tan & Wee, supra note 166, at 15 (“Although a contractual approach 
has judicial support, it operates only by analogy and it must not be forgotten that 
the basis of the court’s jurisdiction lies in equity.  Any contractual analysis must 
ultimately be able to support relief in equity.”). 
208  See supra p. 283. 
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not easy.  Yet, aside from being time-honored,209 this usage is una-
voidable, due to the complexity of human affairs.  Situations and 
relationships, commercial or otherwise, are not made to fit into 
pre-existing molds.210 
6.3.  Other Perspectives on the Share-Equity Link:  History and 
Language 
The close relation between the concepts of shares and equity 
can also be examined from two more perspectives:  historical and 
linguistic.  Historically, modern corporations developed as crea-
tures of equity.  By the 17th century, “joint stock companies” began 
to surface in England.211  In practice, they were very similar to 
partnerships.212  The analogy is that in a partnership, partners have 
the power to influence the legal position of each other, in various 
ways not pre-defined in contract or otherwise, thereby necessitat-
ing the protections of equity; in a company, that power is vested 
mainly with the company itself, and acts toward its shareholders. 
However, partnership law only partly and ineffectively responded 
to the needs of rapidly growing corporations during the 18th and 
19th centuries.213  As a result, “real” company law developed, re-
taining equity as its foundational concept.214  Corporate law 
changed considerably over the years, but equity remains at its 
core.215  As this Article illustrates, the range of situations that 
shareholders can find themselves in is remarkably wide.  Equity 
responds to this fact as it guides the daily practice and adjudication 
of corporate law. 
209  Cf. Maitland, Trust and Corporation, supra note 176, at 109 (“quasi is one of 
the few Latin words that English lawyers really love . . . .”). 
210  Cf. LEVENSTEIN, supra note 58, at 61 (“All law, no matter its content or era, 
is flawed . . . .  Equity could not plausibly surmount this very human limitation, 
but its charge is nevertheless to attempt the impossible.”). 
211  See, e.g., Tan & Wee, supra note 166, at 1. 
212  See id. 
213  See id. at 2. 
214  See id. at 4 (“[A]s the business organisation that was adopted in early 
company law was based on a fusion of partnership and trust law, together with 
the law of agency, which were all heavily infused by equitable doctrines, compa-
ny law was susceptible to the influence of the law of equity.” (citation omitted)). 
215  See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); Sample v. 
Morgan, 914 A.2d 647 (Del. Ch. 2007) (two judicial decisions, reached 88 years 
apart, both pointing to equity as a fundamental norm of corporate law). 
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The linguistic connection between “shares” and “equity” is 
practically taken for granted.  This link does not necessarily prove 
that the two should be related—other sections of this Article deal 
with that.  Rather, it is one proof that they are related, on a very in-
tuitive, culture-wide level.  This connection can be seen in the in-
terchangeable use of the phrases “share,” “stock,” and “equity.”  
For example, the word “equity” might simply be used instead of 
“shares.”216  A textbook might introduce the various types of finan-
cial instruments that a corporation can issue, grouping shares un-
der the title “Equity Securities”.217  The phrase “shareholders’ equi-
ty” is equivalent to “the corporation’s net worth,” or assets minus 
liabilities (obligations to non-residual creditors).  “Shareholders’ 
equity” is very widely used and appears regularly in, among other 
places, corporations’ financial reports218 and the press.219  At a web 
forum devoted to English linguistics, an explanation, generally 
similar to that presented in this Article, was offered in regard to the 
link between the two concepts.220 
7. TOPICS IN SHARE LAW
What else is part of share law?  The previous Parts of this Arti-
cle mainly discuss the equitable principles of share law.  Yet, these 
are only a fraction of that field.  This Part offers a non-conclusive 
list of topics in share law, frequently encountered by businesses, 
216  See, e.g., ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 63, at 145 (using the title “Legal 
Character of Equity” for a section on the characteristics of shares). 
217  See ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, THE LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN BUSINESS 
FINANCING: A GUIDE FOR CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 20 (1994) (describing the basic 
types of equity securities). 
218  See, e.g., Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Form 10-K, SEC.GOV (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1067983/000119312518057033/d437
858d10k.htm [https://perma.cc/KU4G-H848] (annual report mentioning the 
phrase “shareholders’ equity” 28 times). 
219  See, e.g., Sui-Lee Wee, After Wanda Deal, Chinese Property Developer Faces 
Debt Risk, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/14/business/dealbook/china-debt-wanda-
sunac.html [https://perma.cc/TCL3-Q9HH] (“In 2016, the company’s net gearing 
ratio—a measure of total debt to shareholders’ equity—rose to 121.5 per-
cent . . . .”). 
220  See Kevin Beach, Reply in thread titled “Equity - companies and corporations”, 
WORDREFERENCE.COM (Dec. 14, 2010), 
https://forum.wordreference.com/threads/equity-companies-and-
corporations.2007192/#post-10036633 [https://perma.cc/TER8-5C93]. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
312 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 40:1 
lawyers, judges, legislators, and scholars.  This list is meant to 
serve as a guide for further inquiry, tying these topics together un-
der the share law classification. 
1. Statutory share law.  As mentioned above,221 corporate stat-
utes, such as the Delaware General Corporation Law and
the Israel Companies Act, contain multiple sections dealing
with shares.  These statutory provisions, and the myriad is-
sues they cover, are part of share law.  Some of these issues
are also discussed below.
2. Share allocation and dilution.  Shares are a sensitive and ma-
nipulable way to represent claims toward a common pool
of wealth.  For example, when new shares are allocated for
less than the economic value of each current share, wealth
indirectly flows from current to new shareholders.  This is a
core issue of share law, also addressed in litigation and
scholarship.222
3. Dividends and buybacks.  A transfer of economic value from
a corporation to its shareholders, by virtue of them being
shareholders, is known as a distribution.  These actions in-
clude dividends and buybacks.223  This is a hotbed of legal
issues, some among shareholders themselves (for example,
if the distribution is not made equally), some between
shareholders and the corporation,224 and some between the
corporation and its creditors.225
4. Various aspects of mergers and acquisitions.  These are, after
all, transactions in shares.  M&A law might sometimes
seem to focus on issues of corporate fiduciary law, such as
directors’ duties on either side of the Revlon threshold;
221  See supra note 6. 
222  See, e.g., supra note 84; Mira Ganor, The Power to Issue Stock, 46 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 701 (2011). 
223  See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 1 (defining “Dividend” and “Distribu-
tion”). 
224  See, e.g., supra note 83 and accompanying text.  The opposite situation is 
also possible: if an unlawful distribution occurs, see infra note 225, the corporation 
might gain a right of rescission toward the shareholder.  See Israel Companies Act 
§ 310.  This right may also be enforced derivatively by creditors, see supra note 160.
225  See, e.g., DGCL §§ 160(a), 170–174 (establishing mandatory rules to de-
termine when a corporation is allowed to make a distribution to its shareholders, 
requiring that distributions not “impair” the corporation’s capital, or that they be 
made out of the corporation’s profits); Israel Companies Act §§ 301–305, 307, 309–
313 (establishing mandatory rules to determine when a company is allowed to 
make a distribution to its shareholders, requiring, without exception, that it main-
tain its ability to meet all obligations to creditors). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/6
2018] Share Law 313 
however, for such issues to arise, there has to be some (ac-
tual or planned) deal—a share transaction, which must also 
conform with share law.  For instance, when can shares be 
taken away, or even cancelled, without their owner’s con-
sent?  When is it permissible to diverge from the rule of 
equality among identical shares?226 
5. Appraisal rights.  Appraisal is rooted in equitable considera-
tions; the power and information asymmetries inherent to
shares make a determination of their true value, when they
are taken from their owners,227 involve more than looking
at their market price, if they have one at all.  This topic lies
deep within share law; tellingly, appraisal requires no fidu-
ciary breach.228
6. The distinction between shares and other securities.  This topic
is important in the general structure of corporate law,229 as
well as in the preferred share context.230  It is also critical in
accounting:  when a corporation gets money for a newly is-
sued security, those funds have to be placed, in the balance
sheet, under either “liabilities” or “shareholders’ equity.”
226  For example, in Unocal, the corporation announced a self-tender offer, 
aiming for a large buyback of its shares; the offer excluded one shareholder, who 
was trying to acquire control of the corporation at the time.  This unequal treat-
ment, of shareholders having the exact same security, was deemed lawful.  See 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953–54, 955 (Del. 1985) (find-
ing that “in the acquisition of its shares a Delaware corporation may deal selec-
tively with its stockholders”, if the action is not “inequitable”).  Federal securities 
law was later amended to prohibit a discriminatory self-tender offer.  See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13e-4(f)(8) (2006) (“No issuer or affiliate shall make a tender offer unless: . . .
The tender offer is open to all security holders of the class of securities subject to
the tender offer[.]”).  However, unequal treatment of identical shares is still possi-
ble in other M&A-related settings, as with the poison pill, where a rights issue can
be made to some shareholders and not others.
227  The question of which shareholders are entitled to appraisal rights is an-
swered quite differently in different jurisdictions.  See, e.g., DGCL § 262 (granting 
appraisal rights to shareholders voting against a cash-out merger); Israel Compa-
nies Act § 338 (granting appraisal rights to offerees in a potentially coercive tender 
offer).  Appraisal rights may also arise outside of the M&A context, albeit excep-
tionally.  See, e.g., Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay 
for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L. J. 223, 251–54 (1962) (discussing appraisal rights follow-
ing amendment of constitutional documents). 
228  See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Importance of 
Being Dismissive: The Efficiency Role of Pleading Stage Evaluation of Shareholder Litiga-
tion, 42 J. CORP. L. 597, 648 (2017) (“[T]he petitioners in [statutory appraisal] litiga-
tion . . . need not plead any breach of fiduciary duty . . . .”). 
229  See supra Part 4. 
230  See supra pp. 280–81. 
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Therefore, share law must provide clear rules in this area. 
7. Share-related securities.  Such securities include warrants,
convertible bonds, rights issues, restricted share units
(RSUs), and other convertibles.  As with shares (and in dif-
ferent ways, suited to the characteristics of each security),
equity is involved here.  These securities also include
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and similar instru-
ments, giving rise to issues regarding their owners’ precise
legal standing—in other words, to what extent are they like
regular shareholders.
8. Multiple-class equity, as opposed to “one share, one vote”.  This
is a highly salient issue.  Even in Israel, where the stock ex-
change is explicitly prohibited by statute from listing equity
securities of companies with more than one class of
shares,231 recent case law has emerged on this topic.232  All
the relationships dealt with in share law are affected by this
choice:  the shareholder-corporation (as some shareholders
are left without any meaningful say on the corporation’s af-
fairs), shareholder-shareholder (as shareholders of different
classes have diverging interests, and might more readily act
adversely to one another), and shareholder-third party rela-
tionship (the main third party being the corporation’s fidu-
ciaries, who are often personally interested in the existence
of multiple share classes).233
9. Secondary market share transactions.  Here, share law interacts
with securities law.  Such transactions may also lie outside
securities law, as in the case of private corporations.  Quan-
titatively, most share transactions are in the secondary
market, not involving the issuing corporation.  This topic
includes various aspects of the routine trading of shares on
stock exchanges, in addition to other practices—for exam-
ple, equity decoupling, where different rights arising from
231  See Securities Act, 5728-1968, § 46b, SH No. 541 p. 234 (Isr.). 
232  See CC (TA) 40274-09-15 Perrigo Co. plc v. Mylan N.V. (Oct. 28, 2015) 
(Isr.), https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/mechozi/ME-15-09-40274-859.htm 
[https://perma.cc/J9NR-DMB8] (holding that in certain circumstances, mainly 
due to policy considerations such as the promotion of securities market activity, 
shares of a foreign corporation with multiple classes of authorized shares may be 
registered for trading on an Israeli stock exchange). 
233  For recent discourse on this topic, see, e.g., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Perpetual 
Dual-Class Stock: The Case Against Corporate Royalty, SEC.GOV (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-class-stock-case-against-
corporate-royalty [https://perma.cc/HTQ6-ACW3]. 
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a single share (voting, dividends, etc.) are contractually 
transferred, by a shareholder, to different owners.234 
10. Non-economic changes to shares.  This topic involves actions
such as a share split and share consolidation (or “reverse
share split”), as well as the allocation of bonus shares.  As a
rule, these actions represent no transfer of economic value
from one person to another.  Yet, they exemplify how
shares are sensitive to various errors and manipulations.
The seemingly benign “non-economic” transaction might
actually cause a transfer of wealth.  This can happen, for
example, when a shareholder owns a number of pre-
transaction shares that does not wholly divide by the con-
solidation ratio.  If a corrective measure is not taken (name-
ly, the payment of cash or other compensation for the frac-
tional share), some of the shareholder’s claim “disappears,”
or usually, is transferred to other shareholders.  Another
aspect of this topic relates to the shareholder-third party re-
lationship.235  Brokers, banks, online financial information
platforms and others may commit errors, often uninten-
tionally, in the context of non-economic share transac-
tions—for example, treating the share price as if it actually
changed.  Unless these mistakes are recognized and cor-
rected, the loss of legal and economic rights gives rise to a
legally enforceable claim.
11. Shareholder registration.  How does one know who the cor-
poration’s shareholders are?  Usually, through a dedicated
list, administered by the corporation:  the shareholder regis-
ter.  This becomes more complex with public corporations,
whose shareholders change very rapidly.  An important is-
sue in this area is nominee companies, such as Cede & Co.,
who appear in public corporations’ shareholder registers as
“street name” holders.  In Israel, the real, ultimate share-
holders are also the full legal shareholders, for all intents
and purposes;236 it would be advantageous to minimize any
234  See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty 
Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006) [hereinafter: 
Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying]; Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard S. Black, Debt, Equi-
ty, and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, in 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ACTIVISM 349 (William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery 
eds., 2015) [hereinafter: Hu & Black, Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling]. 
235  See supra pp. 277–78. 
236  See Israel Companies Act § 132 (stating that “a nominee company shall 
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confusion around this issue in other jurisdictions as well.237 
Also within this topic is the issue of bearer shares.238 
12. Shareholder meetings and voting.  While shareholders are
normally not fiduciaries for the corporation, their choices
might still bind it; however, no individual shareholder can
do so.239  Rather, shareholders must go through the mecha-
                                                   
not be considered a shareholder of the [issuing public company], and the shares in 
its name are owned by those entitled to them . . . .”, and that upon a shareholder’s 
request, the shareholder’s name shall be registered in the issuing company’s 
shareholder register, in respect to the appropriate number of shares, substituting 
the nominee company’s name).  The nominee company is not even a trustee, as it 
never owns the shares.  It is part of a mechanism related only to registration. 
237  Shares are exceedingly sensitive to various misunderstandings to begin 
with, and the current nominee system in the U.S. makes the situation far worse, 
bordering on the absurd.  See, e.g., Matt Levine, Banks Forgot Who Was Supposed to 
Own Dell Shares, BLOOMBERG (July 14, 2015), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-07-14/banks-forgot-who-was-
supposed-to-own-dell-shares [https://perma.cc/92EH-AU6H] (discussing specif-
ic cases of nonsensical outcomes under the U.S. nominee system).  For an over-
view, see David C. Donald, The Rise and Effects of the Indirect Holding System: How 
Corporate America Ceded its Shareholders to Intermediaries (Sept. 27, 2007), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017206 
[https://perma.cc/JLT8-WGSP].  Reform is clearly needed in this area, possibly 
requiring changes to both state corporate law and federal securities law, to pro-
duce a rule similar to that in other jurisdictions, see supra note 236. 
238  The ownership of a bearer share is not determined using a central regis-
ter, but through a share warrant, which is usually a transferable paper document, 
governed by both share law and negotiable instruments law.  Expectedly, this cre-
ates its own set of issues.  It can rather easily give rise to situations similar to those 
encountered in the Co-Op case, see supra Part 2.  For example, in Switzerland, in 
2018, legislation has been proposed to convert all bearer shares, of all private 
companies, into registered shares, by operation of law.  However, the proposal 
includes the following: “After the expiry of the grace period [for surrendering 
share warrants to the issuing company], shareholders who have not identified 
themselves will definitively lose all rights attached to the shares.  Their shares will 
be deemed void and the company will need to issue, in place of such void shares, 
new shares as treasury shares.”  Daniel Jenny & Florian Jung, Farewell to bearer 
shares and introduction of criminal sanctions for violations of transparency obligations?, 
LEXOLOGY (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f8b31110-c8c2-4099-a0f8-
043e05d3d49a [https://perma.cc/YAQ6-5427].  Given the nature of shareholders’ 
rights, as discussed in this Article, it is clear why that proposal is extremely prob-
lematic.  Furthermore, owners of bearer shares are especially prone to being una-
ware of their shareholding and not contacting the issuing corporation, thereby in-
advertently and unjustifiably being placed at risk of their rights “disappearing.”  
There are many alternatives to the excessive proposal quoted above; one would be 
adopting a similar solution to that reached by the Co-Op Court: registering the 
shares in the names of trustees, or a comparable arrangement, for the benefit of 
the unknown shareholders. 
239  If a shareholder does individually (or in cooperation with others) have the 
power to bind the corporation, or materially influence its course of action, that 
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nism of voting in shareholder meetings.  This topic is in very 
high currency, particularly in the U.S., due to the activist 
shareholder phenomenon.240  It interacts with other topics 
listed here, such as the relation between share law and cor-
porate fiduciary law.  This arises both in director elections, 
and in voting on other proposals, as when shareholders 
seek to constrain management from pursuing certain activi-
ties.  This topic also relates to other issues, such as vote 
buying241 and circular share ownership.242 
13. Other shareholder governance rights.  These mainly include
access to information.243  Such rights are necessary to mini-
mize the information asymmetries that shareholders are in-
herently subject to.  This topic has far-reaching implications
for other areas of corporate law, including the conduct of
shareholder owes fiduciary duties to the corporation.  See supra note 164.  Yet, it is 
possible for many dispersed shareholders, in their meeting, to lawfully reach a 
decision—even one that seriously affects the corporation—with no prior agree-
ment or coordination among themselves, and with none of the shareholders ow-
ing any fiduciary duty.  This is another unique aspect of share law. 
240  See generally INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ACTIVISM (William W. Bratton & Jo-
seph A. McCahery eds., 2015); LISA M. FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A
PRIMER ON SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND PARTICIPATION (2011). 
241  See, e.g., Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982) (defining vote 
buying and upholding the legality of such agreements, if they are not fraudulent 
or disenfranchising); Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying, supra note 234; Hu & 
Black, Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling, supra note 234. 
242  See, e.g., DGCL § 160(c) (suspending the voting rights arising from shares 
owned by the issuing corporation itself, or by another corporation, if the majority 
of the latter’s voting shares are owned by the issuing corporation); Speiser v. 
Baker, 525 A.2d 1001 (Del. Ch. 1987) (broadly construing DGCL § 160(c), by sus-
pending the voting rights attached to shares owned by a corporation effectively 
controlled by the issuing corporation).  In Israel, this pertains to the concept of va-
cant shares, also known as treasury shares or dormant shares.  Such shares are 
created whenever a corporation buys back shares it formerly issued, without im-
mediately cancelling them.  See Israel Companies Act § 308.  Hence, this also re-
lates to the topic of buybacks, see supra p. 312.  Vacant shares provide neither vot-
ing rights nor any other right.  See Israel Companies Act § 308. The principle 
operating here is that it is impossible to contract with oneself; every contractual 
relationship (in this case, that arising from the constitutional documents) must 
have at least two parties; therefore, a corporation cannot be its own shareholder.  
See Israel Contracts Act § 2 (requiring the involvement of at least two persons for 
the formation of a contract).  This is a broader, more exact principle than that in-
voked by Delaware law, which seeks mainly to prevent directors from voting the 
shares of the same corporation they are serving.  In Israel, when a direct subsidi-
ary corporation acquires shares issued by its parent, these become semi-vacant 
shares: they provide no voting rights, for similar reasons to Delaware’s, while 
maintaining all other rights.  See Israel Companies Act § 309(b). 
243  See, e.g., DGCL § 220; Israel Companies Act §§ 184–187, 198a. 
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shareholder litigation.244 
14. Procedural aspects of shareholder litigation.  For example, when
fiduciary law beneficiaries file a complaint in court (either
themselves or through others, as in a derivative action),
they may enjoy a shifted burden of proof, placed on the fi-
duciary-defendant.245  The law recognizes that power and
information asymmetries prevent administration of justice
under the usual procedure, designed for arm’s length dis-
putes.  These asymmetries are shared by all equity claim-
ants, including shareholders.  How do, or should, modified
procedural rules apply to (non-derivative) shareholder
claims?
15. The relation between share law and the law of corporate purpose.
As discussed above, share law—and indeed, the very exist-
ence of shares and shareholders—is closely tied to ques-
tions of corporate purpose.246  Under positive law, the for-
profit corporation’s purpose is the lawful pursuit of prof-
it.247  Shareholders have an equitable claim toward those
profits, along with the rest of the corporation’s net worth.
This is widely known as “shareholder primacy,” but in fact,
it is simply the corporation, like a natural person, being al-
lowed to lawfully act for its own benefit.  Yet, there is an
equitable sensitivity here:  for example, if a legislature an-
nounced that corporations are no longer allowed to have
profits, or that their assets must go to some stakeholders ir-
respective of their pre-existing rights, the corporation itself
244  See, e.g., Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez, 2017 Del. LEXIS 34, at *1 
(Del. Jan. 18, 2017); Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez, 179 A.3d 824, 831 
(Del. 2018) (decisions ultimately dismissing a derivative action filed in Delaware, 
on behalf of Walmart Inc., after the plaintiffs “did exactly what this Court has 
suggested on numerous occasions, namely, use the “tools at hand” to inspect the 
company’s pertinent books and records before filing a derivative complaint.”  
While the Delaware plaintiffs were engaged in the highly preliminary inspection 
stage, which “lasted nearly three years” due to defendants’ resistance, a federal 
court dismissed a less factually detailed complaint, filed by other shareholders.  
On grounds of estoppel, this led to the dismissal of the Delaware complaint). 
245  See, e.g., Michael W. Stockham & Mackenzie S. Wallace, Fiduciary Duty 
Litigation and Burden Shifting, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION (Mar. 4, 2014), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/trialevidence/articles/wint
er2014-0314-fiduciary-duty-litigation-burden-shifting.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z2ZU-LKMF] (“The entire fairness standard . . . [requires] the 
defendants to prove the entire fairness of the transaction . . . .”). 
246  See supra pp. 273–75. 
247  See supra note 142. 
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might not be the only one harmed.  Due to the nature of 
shareholders’ claims, the effect of such a decision could be 
legally and equitably limited, and it might be successfully 
challenged, by the corporation as well as by shareholders. 
16. The relation between share law and corporate fiduciary law.  The
two are distinct, but related.  For example, when the law
gives fiduciaries the power to commit certain acts, such as
amending the constitutional documents, it also narrows
shareholders’ exercise of that power.248  As another exam-
ple, when a corporation is in Revlon mode, or other situa-
tions where directors’ effect on shareholders is not chan-
neled through the corporation, a direct relationship is
formed between its directors and shareholders.249  The in-
teraction between the two fields also appears in situations
where a shareholder, such as a controller, is considered to
be a fiduciary.250
8. CONCLUSION
Classification and precision are important parts of any legal in-
quiry.  Under-categorization or over-generalization can lead to se-
rious difficulties in resolving actual issues, both in and out of court, 
involving very tangible rights.  As Part 2 above details, the 2017 
Co-Op case, which concluded a dispute concerning approximately 
US$15 million, is a clear-cut example of such an occurrence. 
That case, and the legal conundrum it presented (before being 
correctly decided), illustrate how corporate law suffers from a per-
sistent strain of under-analysis:  as shown in Parts 3 and 4 above, 
we readily discuss issues of corporate fiduciary law, which is the 
law of the relationships between the corporation and its fiduciaries, 
248  In Delaware, see DGCL § 109(a) (“[A]ny corporation may, in its certificate 
of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the di-
rectors . . . .”).  The bylaws exist along with and pursuant to the certificate of in-
corporation.  See DGCL § 109(b).  Moreover, any amendment to the certificate of 
incorporation can only be proposed by directors.  See DGCL § 242(b).  In Israel, 
fiduciaries cannot amend the company’s article of incorporation; that power is 
always reserved to shareholders.  Directors, as well as certain shareholders, can 
propose an amendment, but only the shareholder meeting may affect the change.  
See Israel Companies Act §§ 20, 57(1), 58(a), 66. 
249  See supra pp. 298–300. 
250  See supra note 164. 
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such as directors.  Yet, we have not previously paid enough me-
thodic attention to a separate field, also at the heart of corporate 
law:  share law—the law of shares, shareholders, and their rela-
tionships with the corporation, with one another and with third 
parties. 
Although they inform each other, share law is distinct from 
corporate fiduciary law.  Part 5.4 above proves that for the most 
part, shareholders are not owed fiduciary duties.  This distinction 
is practically significant, given the strict obligations, primarily the 
duty of loyalty, imposed by fiduciary law.  Under established law, 
the corporation itself, not anyone else, is the object both of its fidu-
ciaries’ duties, and of shareholders’ and other creditors’ claims. 
Many corporate cases might involve no breach of fiduciary duty, 
yet, a substantial amount of wealth may be at stake. 
Furthermore, Part 5 above reveals that all the jurisprudential 
sources regularly invoked to explain shares—two of them part of 
general “law” (contract and property), the other two offshoots of 
equity (trust and fiduciary law)—explain only parts or certain as-
pects of the share phenomenon; none does so fully or flawlessly. 
Because shares represent a residual claim, they inherently give rise 
to power and information asymmetries, a central factor making 
them impossible to address through “conventional” legal classifi-
cations.  Yet, the total value of shares in the world, their im-
portance in the modern economic structure and human life, and 
their prominence within the governance structure of every corpo-
ration, demand that we examine shares in a more coherent manner. 
When no other source can explain the existence of, or govern 
the adjudication and resolution of questions relating to, certain le-
gal phenomena, a “residual” normative framework applies:  equi-
ty.  From its origins to the present day, equity is designed to enable 
justice-making where it cannot be reached under “law”—in other 
words, through the classifications we are familiar with.  Trust and 
fiduciary law are themselves branches of equity; yet, the properties 
of each preclude them from serving as the foundation of share law. 
We are left with equity itself.  Unsurprisingly, the word “equity” is 
synonymous with “shares,” and “shareholders’ equity” has long 
been interchangeable with “the corporation’s net worth,” which is 
the size of the economic claim held by shareholders.  As Part 6 
above explains, shares and equity are related in multiple ways, and 
on the most fundamental level.  In the case of shares, equity is not a 
“complement” or conscionable “exception” to contract and written 
law; rather, from the outset, equity is the core expectation of the 
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parties to share-based relationships. 
The nuanced understanding of corporate law, from which the 
concept of share law directly results, also informs other hotly de-
bated topics:  namely, corporate personhood and corporate pur-
pose.  The “shareholder/stakeholder” debate is often framed as a 
dichotomy, replete with catchphrases like “shareholder primacy,” 
but this Article suggests there is a third way, strongly supported 
both positively and normatively:  the corporation, a separate per-
son, exists to achieve its own purpose, which is the lawful pursuit 
of profit; shareholders have an equitable (not proprietary or fiduci-
ary, nor contractual) claim toward the corporation; by definition, as 
residual claimants, they rank below all other creditors or stake-
holders—whose rights are determined outside of corporate law.  It 
would be beneficial to consider how this more refined account 
might promote the resolution of that long-standing, high-stakes 
controversy. 
Share law, equally with corporate fiduciary law, is a major field 
of classification within corporate law.  It is the framework for con-
ceptualizing, analyzing, and resolving share-related issues.  These 
issues have existed since the emergence of corporations, but their 
legal treatment has been plagued with various theoretical, doctri-
nal, and practical misunderstandings.  That kind of legal vacuum is 
not an unalterable fact of life.  This Article, for the first time, pro-
poses the concept of share law, allowing us to treat share-related 
issues comprehensively, within a well-defined legal paradigm, 
based on unifying principles, and capable of meeting the specific 
challenges that shares, by definition, give rise to.  Through this 
lens, Part 7 above examines a multitude of high-currency topics 
encompassed by share law, including dividends and buybacks, as-
pects of mergers and acquisitions, appraisal rights, multiple-class 
equity, shareholder voting and activism, and shareholder litiga-
tion.  Lawyerly, judicial, and scholarly inquiries into share law 
should continue, around the world, on a disciplined, methodic ba-
sis.  Hopefully, this Article serves as a starting point for those fac-
ing other questions surrounding that unique creature of human en-
terprise, the corporate share. 
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